
MAGTF Civil-Military Operations



U.S. Marine Corps (Coordinating Draft 01-21-01)

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FORWARD

This publication provides guidance to the MAGTF Commander, his staff, and Marines who leave bases and stations behind. It primarily considers those who go into harm's way. When our nation calls us from our training areas, we find the battlefield has become an increasingly complex and crowded place. Civil-military operations are an element of each and every military operation across the spectrum of operations: every element of the MAGTF may contribute to their planning and execution. The relative effort and resources devoted to CMO will vary with the nature of the MAGTF commander's assigned mission. If not deliberately considered, the intersections between military and civilian may have consequences that defeat the plan that ignores them. At its best carefully planned, coordinated, and executed CMO helps the MAGTF to win by shaping the battlespace, enhancing freedom of action, isolating the enemy, and providing the force access to additional capabilities. At its simplest, it reduces friction which may disrupt MAGTF operations.

Even when fighting for national survival, Marines operate within the boundaries of acceptable international standard. Whenever there are noncombatants in and around our operations, then, there are considerations that qualify the tactics we use and the weapons we employ. Today and tomorrow, in fact, we are increasingly likely to maneuver in a battlespace that is spattered with civilians and spotted with governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations. Noncombatants are deliberately used as targets and as cover by a wide variety of belligerents, especially by those who have no allegiance to state or government. Therefore, the MAGTF commander must continuously take civilian leaders, organizations, and populations into account, just as he provides for the effects of terrain and weather in his actions

Like terrain and weather effects, however, civil-military considerations present opportunities as well as dangers. With attention to less traditional aspects of war, we can add to the range of force we apply to our enemies and complicate the dilemma we create for him. By devoting a degree of attention, as an economy of force measure, we expand the MAGTF commander's area of influence. At the same time, we must address the challenges the enemy presents to us or we risk attacks upon our own cohesion and our pursuit of victory. We must shape the entire conflict, not just the military specifics of the fight. Civil-military operations are not, therefore, actions which occur only prior to a conflict or after its resolution, but instead support and compliment the MAGTF throughout the accomplishment of its assigned mission. Civil-military operations are tools the commander uses in order to prevent conflict, support civil authorities, win battles, and secure peace.

This warfighting publication presents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the planning, coordination, and execution of civil-military operations across the spectrum of military operations. It establishes a framework for analysis, decision and action. This framework builds on the principles established in MCDP 1. It also serves to link the philosophies for command and control and for operations, with the detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures found in other publications. This publication is consistent with and complements Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* and JP 3-57.1 *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, while it focuses on the MAGTF perspective on these functions.

I. The Civil Dimension of Military Operations

"The policy aims that are the motive for any group in war should also be the foremost determinants of its conduct. The single most important thought to understand is that war *must serve policy*."

- MCDP 1 *Warfighting* pg 23

Military Operations and Civil Considerations

Military operations are one of the practical methods with which we pursue our nation's policy objectives. These actions take place in an attempt to prevent conflict, support civil authorities, win wars, and secure peace. Military operations involve more than just the soldiers, arms, and equipment applied to a situation, however. Just as the battlespace has dimensions across the surface, in the air and in space, and through time, each and every operation also has a civil dimension. This dimension becomes tangible among people, not only in the area of operations, but among others in the region, around the world, even among our own citizens. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider not only the actions of armed forces, but also how these actions effect and are affected by a broad mix of non-combatants. These actions and effects make the task of achieving objectives on the battlefield more or less easy to accomplish, both for us and for our enemies. As Clausewitz wrote, *"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes."* We cannot ignore the civil dimension of military operations as if only men and materiel mattered.

We can hardly imagine military operations that do not have a civil dimension. Every day unified commanders employ military forces around the world in "engagement" strategies, designed to enhance US influence and support our public and private diplomacy. These forces are involved in multi-national training and in exercises intended to educate foreign governments and militaries in our values, while persuading them to contribute to international stability. Occasionally US forces respond to "complex emergencies", such as natural disasters that overwhelm civil authorities by degrading many of their infrastructure systems at the same time. When our government determines it to be in our national interest, we contribute to peacekeeping and even peace-enforcement missions, employing force and its threat to deter the destabilizing use of force by others. If our efforts for peace fail, we employ carefully focussed military capability in order to accomplish our national objectives as swiftly and with as little loss of life as is possible. Once hostilities are no longer required, our forces contribute to stabilization, to recovery, and to the reform and improvement of systems that led to the use of violence in the first place.

In every case we will operate in close contact with civilians, in conjunction with their governments, and be watched by both. In order to most effectively and efficiently accomplish our primary missions, to one degree or another we will need to carefully create and cultivate relations between ourselves and the people, government and nongovernmental organizations in our area of operations. Regardless of the mission assigned, these relations will help us to identify and prevent potential friction and may

provide access to civilian resources, allowing us to focus more combat power on the objective at hand. In the complex, chaotic environments of the future, MAGTF commanders will find many unique and useful resources beyond the borders of the MAGTF. As a minimum, these relationships are pursued in order to discourage and prevent more people from actively opposing us. Finally, under the Law of Armed Conflict and U.S. policy, we will need to meet certain obligations towards civilians. **The activities that the commander undertakes in order to create and foster positive relations between military forces and civilians are known as Civil-Military Operations.** Civil-Military Operations are one of the links between the pursuit of national policy and the projection of military power.

Modern wars are not internecine wars in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.
- War Department, General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863

Civil-Military Operations

The term Civil-Military Operations (CMO) describes all of the activities that the commander undertakes between civilians and the MAGTF in order to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission. Effective CMO **minimizes civilian interference with**, and **maximizes support for** the mission. There is a CMO component to each and every military operation, though the MAGTF resources devoted to CMO will vary with particular operations and even throughout the phases of operations. By no means does the term CMO refer merely to operations in which the MAGTF provides support or services to civilians or their governments, such as Humanitarian Assistance efforts. These examples of CMO might occur more frequently than CMO in support of combat operations, but are by no means more important.

Civil-Military Operations:

"Civil-military operations is a broad term used to indicate "the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs forces and other forces. Also called CMO."

- Joint Pub 1-02 *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Instead, CMO support every MAGTF operation across the spectrum of conflict. Sometimes, CMO is performed solely to allow the MAGTF commander to apply combat

power as efficiently as possible in order to win battles and destroy the enemy's military capabilities. At it's best, CMO is an Economy of Force measure: one that applies limited assets to prevent or solve MAGTF problems, and which obtains benefits that outweigh the costs. By creating and successfully managing relations between the MAGTF and the wide variety of civilians on the battlefield, the MAGTF commander helps to shape his battlespace. This enables and facilitates his operations, while complicating his enemies' operations.

Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Forces


Civil Affairs (CA) is a term that is used only to describe designated personnel and distinct units. CA forces are organized and equipped specifically to support CMO and to conduct so-called "CA Activities". These CA activities are those which embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, and which involve the application of particular skills normally the responsibility of civil government. These responsibilities might include Public Administration, Public Health, Economic Development, and Utilities. CMO is a much broader term than CA Activities, though generally they have the same goals. Because of the perspective and training that CA forces gain in the course of training and performing CA activities, however, they have considerable expertise in the planning, conduct, and execution of CMO. **CA is neither a mission nor an objective, but the name of a particular force** that supports the commander's need to exercise command and control over the MAGTF.

Civil Affairs:

"Civil Affairs describes designated active and reserve forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA"
- JP 1-02

It's common to believe that CMO is a responsibility assigned solely to dedicated Civil Affairs forces, or even that the two terms are interchangeable. Instead, every element of the MAGTF may participate in the planning and execution of CMO, and CA forces bring expertise to each and every MAGTF operation. **By themselves, neither CMO nor CA are missions: they are not objectives. CMO are the portions of the military operation that address the civil dimension.** CMO describes the efforts we make to build and use associations with civilian people and groups in order to facilitate our primary military actions. At times, CMO itself may be the focus of our efforts, especially in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Whenever we engage in military operations, our intentions and our actions are scrutinized by a wide variety of audiences. Their interests are often different than our own, even when generally complimentary. Our consideration of these interests results in continuous adjustments to our use of force. In a sense, each of these adjustments is an example of CMO, as we consider the relations between the MAGTF and civilians. These adjustments are intrinsic in all military operations: they are inherent in all command. In fact, CMO is a factor across the spectrum of military operations, and in each of the battlefield functions. It is especially critical in command and control. Whatever the mission, CMO is a constant element throughout the planning and execution of military operations, and not merely an adjunct specialty that occurs before or after hostilities. If we consider these interests as we first design the application

of force, we can help solve the problems that may lead to greater violence. The more effectively we solve these problems, the less expensive is our military involvement.



The Challenge of Modern Operations

It is impossible to know what missions Marines will be assigned tomorrow. We can, however, make some assumptions about the conditions under which we will operate during our commitment, though there will always be exceptions. These assumptions will help us to anticipate our future actions, to prepare for them, and therefore to execute with the minimum of friction and delay. We can consider that these factors are likely to be part of the "Situation" of any operation we engage in, and each will require attention to the relations between the MAGTF and various civilian populations and organizations.

We Will Act in the National Interest Our operations will be in the national interest. Whether we are engaged in armed combat, exercising with allies and strategic partners, or providing relief to victims of natural catastrophe, the National Command Authority (NCA) has decided that our objectives are important. The value of the mission, then, is not synonymous with the degree of force we use. **Regardless of its type, every military mission is necessary, and each requires particular capabilities that military units are best prepared to apply.**

We Will Serve In Expeditionary Environments We will operate far from home. The requirements of Major Theater War (MTW), a Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC), or important theater engagement mission will likely demand that we operate in **varied locations** which are not accustomed or adapted to US military presence. We may need to establish forward bases in support of an operation. The bases we have may be at risk, requiring additional protection, or even additional support locations. In any case the demands of logistic support to a major operation will cause us to use new airfields, seaports, lines of communication, and staging areas. The commander's attempt to create operational maneuver may also require us to work in new locations. In each of these settings, we will interact with civilians and civilian organizations.

Our US Force Will Have New Team Members We will have many partners, and many of them will not wear uniforms. Almost any operational assignment of more than passing duration is likely to be a **joint, Total Force, and interagency effort**. We will work with other components and Services: Active, Reserve, and Guard members. Increasingly, we will work with representatives of various US government (USG), international, and nongovernmental agencies with capabilities and expertise usually not found in the MAGTF. These Other Government Agencies (OGA's) might include diplomats and Foreign Service personnel of the Department of State (DOS), disaster relief specialists from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), international development specialists from the Agency for International Development (USAID), or public health experts from the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Most challenging, many of these partners will not fall under our command, as we traditionally think of it. They will attack the problems as they identify them and in a manner they think fit, but often without any obligation to accept our direction. Most will never have worked together before, and few if any will be subordinate to a military commander. Extraordinary measure will be required to establish **unity of effort**. The intent is to unify the efforts of all elements of our national power, including the power contributed by friends and allies, thereby enabling a focused synergy.

We Will Be Watched By The World Our efforts will be observed, commented upon, and deliberately depicted in order to support specific positions. Each of many observers will watch from different perspectives, literally around the world. Our actions will be perceived differently by each of the watchers, and the watchers will not necessarily be unbiased. The **perceptions** created by our operations will result in changes to political realities, changing in turn the situation for our assigned mission. Every example of CMO therefore has a powerful Information Operations component. **Not only our actions matter: the perceptions our actions create may be even more critical.**

We Will Need Strategic Corporals Small, apparently local actions may have **strategic consequences**. An event at a single checkpoint may change the relationship between the MAGTF and local residents, allied partners, NGOs, or

citizens of the U.S and allied nations. Just as the actions of a single fireteam at a checkpoint may help or hurt the MAGTF's chances for mission success, the actions of the MAGTF will make US policy more or less easy to achieve. Mistakes we make on the first day of operations may have effects years later. Our efforts at the micro-level can help or hurt the entire force. **Therefore, we must prepare all members of the force for their strategic responsibilities.** We must work to avoid mistakes which have the eventual impact of the missing "horseshoe nail".

We Will Fight Alongside Allies Our operations may well involve the forces of other nations in a **coalition or combined** effort. The U.S. always maintains the option to use our military forces wherever and whenever our interests require. It is likely, however, that such events will also be seen as critical interests for one or more of our allies. Recent history in the Balkans, central Africa, and the Pacific show that regional organizations, to include NATO, are increasingly undertaking efforts to correct situations which seem threatening, unjust, or destabilizing. This type of regional response is noted in the United Nations Charter, and the sanction of our actions by the UN can be a powerful force-multiplier in our favor. Actions by one national element of the force or another will also be perceived differently on the ground and around the world, a tool we can use to our advantage. Our allies will have different capabilities, equipment, and values, however. These values will rarely be identical to our own. Established command relationships may allow the commander more or less control over the forces of our allies. Our operations must carefully consider the implications of action by each of the members of the combined force.

Civilians may be Objectives and Targets Civilians may be more than considerations we fight around, like terrain or weather: they may themselves be objectives. They may be **deliberately targeted**; their food, shelter, or water may be attacked. At times, our enemies may not be governments, and they may use civilians as shields and as a base of support. In most cases, a civilian presence must be addressed, if only to permit us to close with and destroy our enemies. In other situations, we must consider civilian needs, either as a matter of policy or because of the perception that ignoring them would create. "In war against non-state actors ... the proximity of innocents is often the enemies greatest advantage."¹

"In short, more and more U.S. military men and women are going to be involved in vague, confusing military actions, heavily overlaid with political, humanitarian, and economic considerations."

Gen A. C. Zinni, USMC

¹ WHERE IS THIS FROM???

We Will Operate In Uncertainty All military operations, from major theater wars to the complex contingencies encountered in other expeditionary operations occur in an inherently uncertain and chaotic environment shaped by continuous human interaction. We will conduct operations without answers to many of our questions. Our every action, even our inaction, will have consequences which change the situation on the ground. Nation-states, and an ever-expanding lineup of non-state actors, will continue the age-old struggle for mastery, wealth and security in a world increasingly provoked by exploding populations, depleted resources, cultural strife and ideological differences.

The commander must shape events within this context of unpredictability. Civilian populations, organizations, and leaders will cause much of this uncertainty. As a function of his command and control (C2) effort, **CMO helps the commander to control some of the chaos**, by providing a focus to our own forces and to the disjointed efforts of various agents on the battlefield, guiding them in directions that support our own. **Even when we cannot direct the efforts of others, coordinating with them can allow us to more accurately predict the situations we will face. This interaction with agencies outside of the MAGTF may also provide answers to some of the questions we consider critical.**

MAGTF CMO is Different

All Joint and Service forces conduct CMO as an element of their operations. Just as other MAGTF operations have characteristics unique from those performed by Joint and sister services, so are the supporting civil-military operations. All of our plans and preparations for CMO must consider the unique requirements of support to the MAGTF.

- **The Marine Corps organizes forces for operations as a MAGTF.**

All MAGTF capabilities are under the direction of a single commander. This increases the number of intersections between Marine forces and civilians, but also simplifies the command and control process guiding how they will be conducted. When our mission puts relative emphasis on civil military concerns, such as during Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations, a single commander has a complete suite of tools with which to Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.

- **The MAGTF May Serve as an Initial Entry Force.**

As the enabling force the MAGTF and its CE serve as the "cornerstone" for joint and combined forces which enter the JOA later. MAGTF CMO planners must create an information system or architecture that supports the later deployment of additional CMO planners. These later deploying forces might serve at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Marine interaction with the variety of civil populations in the AO establishes an initial set of conditions. The perception we create as the first US forces deployed to an operation will also set the stage for the remainder of our efforts, within the AO, in the region, and among other domestic and international audiences. If our first contacts are

positive, the JTF fight is easier. If the first civilian reactions are negative, the fight may be impossible. As an Initial Entry Force (IEF), Marine CMO shapes the battlespace for later MAGTF, JTF, or Combined efforts.

"The Marine Corps, as the nation's force in readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict."
- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

- **The MAGTF May Fight from the Sea**

Some or all of our forces may remain aboard amphibious shipping, presenting both advantages and disadvantages to our appreciation of civil-military concerns. As an advantage, we may have the benefit of a secure and supportive location from which to begin initial coordination and conduct planning with civilian leaders and organizations. We may also have access to sophisticated communications links that support "reach-back" to specialized skills such as cultural, economic, and industrial information required to support operations. Amphibious and Maritime Pre-positioning shipping also serves as a relatively secure logistics base, ready to immediately begin providing supplies and equipment.

As a challenge, we must be prepared to execute CMO as our first forces phase ashore or even deploy directly upon the objective. We will not have the luxury of time and space to "build-up" our CMO effort. Therefore, we may need to develop "Packages" of resources that can be rapidly applied to CMO either according to plan or on-call. We will also find it more difficult to establish and develop the interpersonal relationships with civilians that are critical to CMO that supports the MAGTF mission. Dedicated personnel, including CA Marines, may need to be deployed ashore even while the bulk of the CE remains at sea. Finally, especially during MOOTW missions, our efforts may be tied to ship availability and deployment schedules, rather than by the accomplishment of specific tasks or assumption of responsibilities by other agencies.

- **CMO policy will be established outside of the MAGTF.**

JFCs will establish policies for CMO, and MAGTF CMO must be responsive to this guidance. The JFCs' CMO staff will primarily be composed of US Army CA personnel provided by USSOCOM, both at the unified and sub-unified levels. This will require careful coordination and communication, including liaison, to ensure that MAGTF CMO concerns are effectively integrated into the JFCs' policy and planning. At the same time, the MAGTF must integrate CMO policy from above into its operations.

- **The MAGTF intends decentralized operations.**

We neither expect nor intend that individual Marines and leaders will ask for instructions as opportunities and threats present themselves. Instead, we must ensure that every member of the MAGTF, and especially its small-unit leaders, are prepared for situations as they arise. This will require well-designed training, and efficient staff work. Our command and control efforts must provide each Marine with an appreciation of the changing situation, and clear guidance that will lead to success in the field.

"A drunken brawl in a village saloon is CMO. A fast and clever CA operator would quickly grab a PsyOp'er and distribute leaflets to advertise the fight, sell tickets and cut the saloon owner in for a piece of the action"

-LTC Smith, USA, USSOCOM

The MAGTF will interface with civilians

The MAGTF will need to coordinate with a wide variety of non-military populations, organizations and leaders. The presence of these civilians on the battlefield and in the MAGTF Area of Operations will be part of the Situation, as are Terrain and Weather. They will have varying impacts on the manner in which we plan and execute our operations. When we work with them, we can add to the variety of capabilities which the MAGTF commander can influence. When we fail to work with them, we will be confronted with additional frictions that complicate the accomplishment of our mission. It will be critical to appreciate civilians as individuals and as groups and to understand their differing priorities and skills. Some of the wide varieties of civilians we can expect to interface with include:

- **Populations**

People live in the areas in which we operate. They are different: from ourselves, and often from each other. As we plan and operate, we must consider some of the following factors that cause them to think and act according to varying priorities:

- Indigenous Civilian Populations
 - Men as well as women
 - Factions/Groups
 - Ethnic
 - Racial
 - Language
 - Economic
 - HN Contractors/service providers
- Indigenous Civilian Leaders- We can not hope to communicate with each and every resident of the AO. Instead, we seek to communicate with their leaders, those who influence and guide the opinions and actions of the population. It is essential that we understand the critical importance of the selection of those individuals and organizations we choose to communicate and coordinate with. **If we attempt to work with people simply because they are available, or seem to be disposed to work with us, we may alienate the mass of the population we hope to work with.** We must work with real leaders. **We must also understand that positions and titles may not indicate true power or influence.** We must be exceptionally careful to realize that the leaders we select for communication and coordination have priorities, power bases, and biases of their own. Leaders of public action and opinion include:
 - Government/Political

- Religious
- Ethnic
- Grassroots/Opinion Leaders
- Public Safety/Administration/Health

• **Other Government Agencies**

Military forces are only one of the instruments of national power. Other tools are guided by Other Government Agencies (OGAs). Across the spectrum of operations, we are certain to operate alongside these agencies. OGAs we are likely to meet on the battlefield include:

- American Embassy (AMEMB) personnel
- Department of State
- US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
- Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)

• **International and Nongovernmental Organizations (IOs/NGOs)**

The situations which lead to the deployment of the MAGTF and other US forces will also attract the efforts of International and Nongovernmental Organizations. These agencies have expertise, area understanding, and demonstrated sustained commitment in the AO that the MAGTF needs but typically does not have. Without coordination and communication, their efforts will often conflict with our own. With coordination, we achieve synergy, and establish conditions that lead to mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force reducing costly and time consuming duplications of effort between military, government and non-government agencies. The relationship between the MAGTF and IOs/NGOs must be mutually beneficial: these organizations are not under our command. If the relationship with the MAGTF does not add value to their operations, they will not work with us.

▪ **Civilians outside the AO**

MAGTF operations are linked to strategy. We must be aware that our actions must support these strategies. These strategies will consider the opinions and action of civilians around the world, including:

- In the region
- Among our allies and partners
- Domestic considerations
- Among other nations of the world.

" The role of the combatant commanders is crucial and requires acute political sensitivity (the supporting joint and component commanders also play key roles in this regard)."

-Joint Pub 1 *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*

Legal/Doctrinal Roots

Policy and the doctrinal basis for CMO are contained in a number of sources. The most important of these is the legal responsibilities between commanders and their forces to civilian populations as described in the Law of Armed Conflict. Department of Defense policy for civil affairs and many CMO concerns is contained in DOD Directive 2000.13 Civil Affairs. Doctrine is contained in Joint Pub 3-57 *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, and in Joint Pub 3-57.1 *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*. Doctrinal publications of the other Services, while not directive, are generally complimentary and serve as valuable resources to the MAGTF.

“The presence of so many civilian refugees in the streets and rubble vastly complicated the battle and necessitated extraordinary measures to ensure target identification and limit indiscriminate firing. Whenever troops stopped to reorganize “children appeared among them,” observed Life magazine photographer David Douglas Duncan. ‘Children gentle and tiny and wide-eyed as they fastened themselves to the men who first ignored them...then dug them their own little foxholes and expertly adapted helmets to fit their baby heads.’ ”

- *Battle of the Barricades: U.S. Marines in the Recapture of Seoul*

Civilian Action

At its core, MAGTF CMO asks the following questions about civilian populations, organizations and leaders:

- **What will they do?**
- **What do we want them to do?**
- **How can we make that happen?**
- **What do we need to know in order to make that happen?**

II. CIVIL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES

"2. CONCEPT. The operation will feature multiple parallel and concurrent operations conceptually divided into five phases:
1.) Stop the dying in Goma,
2.) Encouragement of refugees to return to their homes,
3.) Support of stability in home provinces and to Humanitarian Relief Organizations,
4.) Turnover of support activities to appropriate UN agencies and
5.) Redeployment of U.S. forces."
Joint Task Force Hope SUPPORT HOPE Operational Concept
26 July 1994

Fundamentals

- Support the Commander

The first fundamental objective of CMO is the support of the MAGTF commander in the accomplishment of his mission. **CMO never has assistance to any other organization or group as its primary purpose: these efforts are secondary to whatever operations the commander determines are required for accomplishment of his mission.** This point seems obvious when the mission at hand is a traditional combat operation, in which armed enemy forces must be engaged and defeated, often in sparsely inhabited terrain. The line becomes somewhat blurred when the combat takes place in an urban environment. Here, adherence to the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) may require the commander to take measures to move civilian populations out of the line of fire, or use measures which limit his fires and their effects. Still, it is apparent that the defeat of the enemy is of primary importance, and CMO must support this mission.

Confusion about the objectives of CMO occurs most frequently while executing Operations Other Than War (OOTW). When these operations are intended to provide assistance to the victims of natural disasters such as famine or earthquake, it can seem as if CMO places US assets at the disposal of other authorities. **While such use may well benefit other agencies and groups, it is done at the direction of the MAGTF commander** when HE is directed to support specific programs judged to be in the national interest. Depending on the MAGTF's tasking, CMO will have a greater or lesser part to play in support of the objective. In the case of peacetime Theater Engagement efforts, the objective is to prevent the need for use of force. The presence of the MAGTF is designed to reassure local inhabitants about the support of the U.S., to demonstrate U.S. resolve to threatening regimes, or to assist in the improvement of local services. In sum, MAGTF CMO supports the commander's efforts to accomplish his military mission.

- Win the Fight

The second fundamental objective of MAGTF is to win the fight. Our nation's Armed Forces are structured to win wars: any element of the force that cannot contribute to

warfighting is unnecessary, even wasteful. **Therefore, the first job of any MAGTF elements assigned a CMO mission is to win the fight at hand, and to prepare to win the fight of tomorrow.** MAGTF CMO planning must first consider the needs of combat forces, and how CMO can contribute to achieving "full spectrum dominance", enabling us to continue to win "in every clime and place". Just as we have learned to expand the commander's attention to include the altitude and depth of the battlefield, CMO helps us to understand and win in the civil dimension. Among other means, CMO supports winning the fight by:

- **Gain Situational Awareness.** MAGTF elements supporting CMO contribute to the commander's "finger-tip feel" and reduce the fog in which operations are planned and conducted. Frequent association with civilians, NGO's, and International Organizations provides information which contributes to the military estimate of the situation- even if no other military forces are deployed in the AO. Marines such as CA forces who are tasked with assisting civil authorities and other leaders provide the commander with rare insight into the conditions under which he is operating, and may help identify opportunities for aggressive action in support of the MAGTF mission. **CMO provides information that supports the commander's capability for intuitive decision making.** It can also provide detailed tactical information that supports combat operations.
- **Enhance Freedom of Action** Effective CMO introduces options for the employment of forces and ensures the MAGTF commander can take maximum advantage of the battlespace available to him. **It helps to extend operations to the fullest breadth and depth feasible, by minimizing political, force, and logistics constraints.** CMO supports the commander to array forces on the battlefield so as to maximize their operational effectiveness. This may require the enemy to disperse forces over a broad area, resulting in the virtual attrition of those forces and complicating enemy planning. MAGTF aviation elements can be based so as to minimize flight time to targets, increasing time available to support ground maneuver, or enabling more attacks on deep targets. Maritime Prepositioning Operations must be supported by CMO, enabling the commander to achieve Operational Maneuver. CMO can also make logistics lines of communication, air- and seaports available to the MAGTF, enhancing support to the force. Finally, by developing efficient links to local governments and communities, CMO removes these stresses from subordinate commanders, freeing them to focus on mission accomplishment.

Text Box: " There are many components to securing the freedom to act. Effective diplomatic, economic, military, and informational components of national security strategy are needed to act at the national level."

Joint Pub 1 *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*

- **Isolate the enemy.** CMO works to limit the enemy commander's freedom of action, preventing support of civilian populations to the enemy forces. These civilians might be within the AO, in neighboring countries, or elsewhere within the region. Often enemy forces will attempt to provide services and security to the populace that the legitimate government cannot or will not provide. In return, enemy forces may gain logistical support, information used in intelligence, and even economic or political support. MAGTF CMO is directed to minimize the support given to the enemy by solving problems first, and by winning the information fight, persuading the populace that their loyalties are better placed in U.S. and Coalition forces. Aggressive CMO also counters asymmetric threats by denying the threat a supportive environment in which to operate.

"And III MAF's combined action program in Vietnam which attacked the Viet Cong by eliminating their essential popular support base throughout the pacification of rural villages. "
- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

- **Support the Force** Effective CMO adds additional capabilities to the MAGTF commander's toolbox, including those potentially provide by Host Nations, Other Gov't Agencies and NGOs. CMO supports sustainment and provides access to logistics and support capabilities which are otherwise external to the MAGTF. This supplements MAGTF resources and allows military capabilities to remain dedicated to supporting the force. It may also permit greater massing of combat power, by allowing for the transportation of forces into an AO without all the support capabilities which otherwise must accompany them. By minimizing the logistics footprint, CMO also reduces the commander's need to dedicate combat resources to protect his logistics centers. Of course, reliance on civilian means of support will present new and different force protection and security challenges.

"To successfully project American military power, assistance with deployment, arrival, and enroute support are critical requirements from our allies and friends. Host Nation Support and mutual support between allies should be constantly enhanced."
- Joint Pub 1 *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*

Employ as a weapon CMO has an effect on the enemy's situation. Aggressive CMO by the MAGTF demands the enemy commander consider the relationship between his force and civil populations and organizations that may influence his operations. It thereby increases uncertainty and doubt in the enemy commander's mind. As enemy forces realize they lack the support of civilian populations, they begin to doubt their purpose. In both cases CMO contributes to our Command and Control Warfare (C2W) efforts, and increases the dilemma with which we confront the enemy. As we make the environment less supportive

of his actions and objectives, we shape the battlespace and contribute to the "turbulent and deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope". A MAGTF commander will often require the ability to apply pressure or exert influence to affect the character of activity within the environment, or upon the capabilities of a potential adversary. Pressure may be exercised through economic, diplomatic, informational or physical capacities, and could be derived from commercial interests, academia, NGOs and government sources. CMO is the means by which the commander seeks to exert this pressure through these civilian agencies. We must also use CMO defensively to counter threat attempts to attack our critical vulnerabilities such as coalition coherence and political support.

"More often than not, the center of gravity will be an intangible, essential element of the political and moral forces that keep our enemies in the fight against us"
- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

Win the Perception Battle Connectivity through global communications will ignite passions, spark perspectives, crystallize beliefs, and compel people, nations, organizations, and institutions everywhere to think and act in accordance with the perspectives, and often biases, of those with whom they interact. As an element of Information Operations, CMO puts "meat on the message"; demonstrating in practical ways the proof of the information we want to stress and countering threat propaganda. This information battle shapes the battlespace and influences commanders and soldiers alike, and is fought across the spectrum of CMO--from peace to crisis to conflict-- and at all levels of war.

Classic CMO Objectives CMO has three classic objectives, which are distilled from the objectives above. Attention to them guides every interaction between the MAGTF and civilians, and must be integrated throughout every operation.

- **Minimize Civilian Interference** The MAGTF must assume that civilians will interfere with operations, generally unintentionally and in the process of attempting to live their lives. Planning and execution must account for this interference, either by avoiding actions and locations that are likely to suffer from interference, or by taking measures to minimize interference with a chosen course of action. For example, the MAGTF may intend to cross a river over a particular bridge. It is likely that the movement of civilians, including Dislocated Civilians (DCs) will slow or disrupt our movement. The MAGTF might choose to use another bridge, less likely to be used by civilians, or to use helicopters or assault amphibians to avoid bridges entirely. Alternatively, if the bridge is critical to the concept of operations, coordination with local law enforcement officials, and/or the use of Military Police might help to control traffic to permit unimpeded travel by MAGTF forces.

- **Maximize Civilian Support** The MAGTF must actively take measures to take advantage of civilian physical and human resources. We use civilian supplies and logistics resources whenever appropriate. More importantly, by creating a supportive moral environment among civilian populations and organizations, the MAGTF has access to skills and information it would not otherwise have. This might include language, cultural, geographic, or economic information. At it's most successful, CMO facilitates the collection of information from civilian sources that supports force protection and can be turned into intelligence. Whenever possible, the MAGTF hopes to make friends, or at least avoid making more enemies.
 - **Meet Legal and Moral Obligations** Under international law and by U.S. policy the MAGTF commander has responsibilities to the civilian populace in his area of operations. Adherence to these responsibilities aids the relationship between the MAGTF and civilians. More importantly, it supports the policy objectives and the strategy which directed the operation in the first place and leads to mission accomplishment
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Principles Regardless of the specific situations, CMO typically share a number of common principles in how we accomplish our civil-military objectives. CMO supports all military operations across the spectrum, including operations during war. While understanding this, we also find that the principles in established Joint doctrine for MOOTW are an excellent guide during CMO. To the MOOTW principles we add additional techniques which again apply to all MAGTF CMO.

- **Objective:** The objective of CMO is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. MAGTF commanders must understand the JFC's strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Effective CMO helps to synergize the efforts of a wide variety of agencies with those of the MAGTF. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. Defining mission success may be difficult in CMO but specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment. MAGTF commanders, especially when operating independently, must translate their strategic guidance into appropriate military objectives through continuous mission and threat analysis. Finally, the commander should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective.
- **Unity of Effort:** The goal here is to seek unity of effort among all agencies in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. In OOTW and CMO it is important that the MAGTF rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort across agencies. While the MAGTF does not hope to exercise command and control of external agencies, it instead can exercise communication and coordination, including liaison. While

unity of effort is usually not possible with external agencies, we can achieve unity of purpose by identifying commonly agreed to goals and coordinating the means by which we seek to achieve them.

- **Security:** The goal here is to never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. The principle of security presents unique challenges to CMO, which inherently seeks to increase contact with new partners and to facilitate information flow. Commanders and staffs must also consider if civilian facilities and agencies will be provided with armed protection.
- **Restraint:** Here we must apply appropriate military capability prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes: violations can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war.
- **Perseverance:** The purpose of this is to prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some military operations supported by CMO may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. Often the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.
- **Legitimacy:** The purpose of the legitimate use of force is to convince our enemies that it is unwise and, in the final analysis, wrong to make war against us. All efforts in support of the mission must contribute to the perceived legitimacy of our operations, the forces involved, and the countries and organizations pursuing success. Each of a wide variety of audiences must see the operation as both legally and morally correct, supporting internationally agreed-to objectives while employing acceptable means. We must enhance the stature of civil structures we are supporting, including local and national governments, as well as regional or international coalitions and alliances we represent. Throughout, we consider how threat forces will attempt to portray our forces and operations as they try to attack local and international support for our actions and break apart critical alliances and coalitions.
- **Impartiality:** The situation we are involved in will often include conflicts between people, parties, and organizations. These factions may be the parties

"When the soldiers in my company held a Christmas party for the children in our sector, we carefully prepared identical parties for identical numbers of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim, with the same number of presents for each. We ensured that the parties would be observed and reported by the locals, so that there could be no perception that we favored one side or another."

- British Company Commander, UN Protective Force, Bosnia-Herzegovina

involved in an armed conflict; religious, ethnic, or regional groups battling over power and resources; or political leaders and organizations taking advantage of an emergency to enhance their power, prestige, or position. Whenever possible, our forces and operations observe strict impartiality, leaving all but armed conflicts to be resolved by the citizens and residents themselves without interference or influence from us. As with so much else in CMO, the perception of our impartiality is at least as important as our actual intent. During both planning and execution we consider whether or not our actions may inadvertently be perceived as favoring one or another of competing individuals and parties, and take steps to counter negative impressions.

- **Consent:** Almost exclusively, our interactions with civilians are based on their consent, instead of simply upon our military power or bureaucratic direction. Very often, our mission is specifically to support a civil organization, such as a Lead Federal Agency directing emergency response within CONUS, or a Host Nation government and its agencies. The IOs, NGOs, and relief agencies we interact with are not subject to our directions: in fact, they may actively work to demonstrate their independence from any military force. Representatives of other USG agencies (OGA) may often operate outside of our chain of command. Even when law permits us to require certain actions of civilian populations, a campaign to create and reinforce their willing consent with our directions will always greatly enhance our ability to accomplish our military objectives. This need to obtain consent before action must be communicated to our most junior leaders.
- **Regional and Cultural Considerations.** Just as maneuver warfare orients on the enemy, CMO ceaselessly accounts for the regional and cultural specifics of the situation. Our plans and actions must take into account the goals, standards, and values of the people with whom we work, never assuming that they are the same as those we were born with or trained to accept. Our motives and methods will be questioned by those not accustomed to us, and our efforts may be directed towards goals not appreciated by those we are trying to support. Our expectations for the behavior of other people and organizations may not be met if we take for granted that others will work as we would, and for the same reasons.

"It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms. We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, fights as we do, or has the same values or objectives."

- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

- **Support to Civil Authority** We understand that all military operations are guided by the civilian leadership of our country, but CMO often requires us to be responsive to much more immediate direction. Military actions that are CMO intensive, such as Consequence Management or Humanitarian Assistance, will place the MAGTF directly in support of civilian leaders and agencies. Operations

within the United States will be in support of a designated Lead Federal Agency. Certain Operations Other Than War overseas, such as HA efforts, may be in support of a Host Government, a Regional or International Organization. These operations will be closely coordinated with, and may be directed by, the Ambassador or Chief of Mission.

- **Combined Action** CMO is most effective when it embraces the people and organizations of the region in which it is performed. **Including the efforts of local people, organizations, and authorities can leverage every interaction between our forces and others.** The detailed and current knowledge, practical experience, and specific skills our allies possess are otherwise unobtainable. Our Military Police are more effective when teamed with respected civil police: our operational planners are aided by consulting with local authorities. Even the operations of our tactical elements are enhanced when conducted integrated units. In each case combined actions with the participation of respected local individuals and institutions enhances the perception of the legitimacy of our operations (both locally and in international eyes), aids in achieving consent, and maximizes our appreciation of regional and cultural considerations. **First, we should always operate from a basis of partnership and mutual respect.**

"For me, the Battle of Khafji involved one of the most difficult decisions I've ever had to make. It truly was the opportunity of a lifetime for a Marine. But it was also an opportunity for us as Americans to demonstrate our belief, our trust, our confidence in the Arab Coalition Forces. Therefore, with MajGen Myatt's concurrence and support, we deferred to the Arab Forces. The Battle of Khafji was a tactical victory for the Arabs: it was a strategic victory for the Americans."

– Col John Admire, Commanding Officer, 3d Marines/Task Force Taro, Operation Desert Storm

"The struggle was in the rice paddies....in and among the people, not passing through, but living among them, night and day and joining with them in steps toward a better life long overdue."

Memoirs of Gen. Lew Walt USMC, Retired

- **USG Agency Coordination** CMO and the military missions they support are certain to become even more complex, requiring the effective coordination and integration of diverse US interagency activities. Proper coordination creates and updates a "Common Operational Picture", as each agency disseminates the information it gathers. Effective coordination provides mutual support and results

in Unity of Effort, and ensures that all efforts are directed towards a common purpose. These efforts are most effective, however, when they leverage each other's capabilities, taking advantage of the complimentary characteristics of different agencies. **Just as we integrate other capabilities to take advantage of the synergy of combined arms, coordination of all USG efforts brings additional capabilities into the battlespace and serves as a force multiplier.**

- **Facilitation of Effort** CMO is primarily planned and performed so that the MAGTF facilitates the efforts of other organizations, rather than performs functions itself. For example, there may be a requirement to feed a group of civilians. The MAGTF could task the CSSE with this specific mission, providing not only the food itself but also the logistics required to deliver the food. Preferably, however, the MAGTF might identify an agency with available foodstocks, and perhaps another with logistics capabilities. By coordinating with these agencies, and perhaps by providing enabling capabilities such as security, communications, air-or seaport access, the mission is accomplished without unnecessary use of military resources. **By developing and advertising simple procedures and single points of contact, the MAGTF enables other agencies with substantial resources to meet requirements with minimum use of MAGTF resources.** MAGTF C2 functions are especially important in CMO, helping to identify the Center of Gravity of a situation, then applying planning and coordination skills to resolve it. This type of facilitation requires that MAGTF planners have a comprehensive Situational Awareness of the resources and capabilities potentially available, as well as specifics on how to coordinate with appropriate agencies. Whenever possible, CMO seeks synergy: the combination of efforts and resources, which has a combined effect greater than these same resources would have if working in isolation.

"The bottom line is that a military peacekeeping operation will reach its desired end-state quicker, if a conscious effort is made to assist the humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and, where possible, the local or national authorities, in taking over all the humanitarian tasks".

-Statement by Mr. Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator and Director, OCHA-Geneva. For meeting of the "Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping" NATO HQ, Brussels 24 April, 1998

- **Assessment and Analysis** Like every other MAGTF operation, CMO seeks to carefully apply capabilities where they will create and exploit success, while minimizing wasted effort. The MAGTF will rarely have unique capabilities, the quantity of resources required to solve all problems, or the intent to do so. What the MAGTF does bring to crisis is a capable C2 system, which must apply standard Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to new objectives. Key among these is the concept that Operations must follow Intelligence: we must Observe and Orient on the situation before we Decide and Act. Every CMO is many times more successful when dedicated personnel participate in the earliest on-scene assessment efforts, prior to the deployment of forces or the start of operations. In

CMO, as in other operations, we follow “Reconnaissance-pull”. A common understanding of the problem leads to a common sense strategy. This permits the crafting of commander's intent which can be followed by decentralized and non-hierarchical organizations. The MAGTF must also assess the efforts of civilian organizations and the population itself, seeking to build upon the demonstrated success of others.

- **Information Component** CMO is inherently an element of the US information campaign, and the MAGTF's information battle. The relationship between the US military forces and the civilians with which it interfaces is part of the message that the US sends by conducting its operations in the first place. At the tactical level, the actions between the MAGTF and civilian organizations puts deeds to words, providing tangible examples of the US force's intentions. Conversely, **when MAGTF interactions with civilians *may* be portrayed in a negative light by our opponents, they *will be*.** This may have the effects of turning local civilians away from us, to breaking down the coherence of coalition operations, to damaging the credibility of the mission around the world and among US citizens and leaders. These mistakes may require us to specifically undertake efforts to rebuild support, requiring the use of resources that could otherwise have been dedicated to mission accomplishment instead. Information Operations is an integrating concept that facilitates the warfighting functions of command and control, fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, and force protection, not simply another “arrow” in the MAGTF commander's quiver. It is, rather, a broad-based capability that “makes the bow stronger. The information component of CMO must not be merely anticipated, it must be aggressively exploited. CMO helps the MAGTF's operations to have greater power than simply that resulting from on the field. They help to win public support, solidify our coalitions, support our public diplomacy, and attack the mind of the enemy commander. Because we will make mistakes of omission and commission, we must plan, act, and inform our audiences about sufficient positive interactions that we win the overall info battle.
- **Combined Arms Approach** Just like every other operation conducted by the MAGTF, **CMO requires the imaginative integration of a number of capabilities.** These capabilities may be performed by individual Marines and by various units from across the force. For example, CMO not only requires intelligence in order to properly plan, it also provides information that the MAGTF can then process to provide intelligence support for other operations. When CMO is the main effort, either as a principle mission or during a phase of an operation, it should be supported by other capabilities such as SIGINT, PSYOP, even maneuver and fires.

Types of CMO

Every action the MAGTF performs which involves civilians outside the DoD chain of command is an example of CMO. In order to facilitate planning and execution,

however, many of these activities can be grouped into particular categories, or types². The following are the types of CMO most often performed by the MAGTF:

- **Populace and Resources Control (PRC).** The MAGTF, usually in conjunction with civil authorities, will often exercise PRC. Operations in PRC provide security for the civilian population, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize civil materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace controls include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. A subdivision of PRC operations are Dislocated Civilian Operations(DC Ops).
- **Foreign Nation Support (FNS).** ***** (Awaiting determination in JP 3-57 by USSOCOM) *****

FNS is the identification, coordination, and acquisition of FN resources such as supplies, materiel, and labor, to support mil forces and operations. The preferred means of fulfilling combat service support (CSS) requirements is to get appropriate goods and services locally through FNS. In some theatres, specific terms describe categories of FNS. Host nation support (HNS) is support provided by a friendly country for mil operations conducted within its borders, based on mutually concluded agreements. HNS includes the planning, negotiations for, and acquisition of such support. HNS is also called Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is within NATO. FNS may, however, also include support from countries that have no mutual agreements.
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** HA encompasses short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. HA is usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat. HA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civilian authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. This type of assistance must not duplicate other forms of assistance provided by these agencies. MAGTF resources will generally be utilized only to assist or supplement civilian resources. The guiding principle is to **only do what the civilian authorities or humanitarian relief organizations cannot do, or that which is mission essential.**
- **Military Civic Action (MCA).** MCA involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. **MCA use preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population** at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of military forces with the population. MAGTF forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA projects also result in popular support for the MAGTF and its mission. MCA is predominantly planned as short-term projects. Due to the legal considerations required of providing

² Types of CMO performed by Joint Forces are identified in JP 3-57 "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations". As the Joint Force Commander will be supported by CA personnel trained in functional specialty skills, the Joint Force may undertake more specialized forms of CMO. MAGTF CMO will generally be more limited than that performed by the Joint Force as a whole.

US resources to foreign military forces, and governments, close attention to plans and procedures is required by the SJA.

- **Nation Assistance Operations.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) **rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory** during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation Assistance Operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA), FID, and HCA. All Nation Assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador's Country Plan.
- **Civil Preparedness and/or Emergency Operations.** Civil preparedness and/or emergency operations are those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: (1) minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by a disaster; (2) deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and (3) effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster. Disaster preparedness is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies. It deals essentially with preparations for the immediate emergency conditions created by a disaster. These conditions might include those caused by armed conflict. **MAGTF forces typically perform Civil Preparedness Operations when scheduled in support of a CinC's Theater Engagement Plan.** This may include MAGTF CA personnel supporting Joint requirements.
- **Civil Administration.** Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory, human rights law, the international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict war covering conflicts of an international or internal character. Civil Administration may be undertaken by agreement with a Host Nation which has lost the capacity to carry out its own affairs, or when the MAGTF takes part in the occupation of enemy territory. Civil administration is undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the NCA. **The MAGTF has only limited capability to undertake civil administration with organic assets.** However, these limitations do not relieve the commander for ensuring that requirements are met. If there is such a requirement for civil administration, the MAGTF will require support via the Joint Force Commander, to include civil affairs functional specialists and military judge advocates as well as civilian Public Safety, Public Administration, and legal experts. It will take time for this support to be provided, so the MAGTF must carefully consider and coordinate its requirements if there is any possibility the MAGTF will need to fulfill its legal and moral responsibilities to civilian populations under international standards.
- **Domestic Support Operations (DSO)³.** DSO usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a **major disaster** and are designed to supplement the efforts and

³ JP 3-07.7 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations* provides detailed information on DSO, including C2 relationships for different types of operations.

resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and voluntary organizations. **The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of other federal agencies** in accordance with the Federal Response Plan⁴ and unified command supporting plans. Military forces are typically organized in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA), such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Justice. Local commanders may also act in the event of an emergency under “immediate response authority” in order to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate great property damage prior to receiving direction from higher headquarters. Immediate notification of the chain of command is required. **Because of the sensitivities related to the domestic employment of military forces, it is essential to involve both SJA and PA planners as early as possible.** DSO includes three broad categories:

- **Military Support to Domestic Relief Operations (DRO).** Support to DRO includes responding to and mitigating the effects of a natural or manmade disaster. These may include earthquake, forest fire, flood, chemical spills, power outages, and mass immigration emergencies. **Employment of Marine forces is most appropriate in the early, or “response” stage of a DRO, focusing on life-saving and sustainment of the civilian population, transitioning those responsibilities to civilian organizations as soon as practicable.** FEMA is generally the LFA, and is typically in support of the affected state or local government.
- **Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).** Operations include Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), counterdrug, combating terrorism, EOD support, and training for civilian law enforcement officials. Laws governing MSCLEA are complex and often change. **It is essential to involve the SJA throughout planning and execution.** The Department of Justice or one of its agencies is generally the LFA.
- **Military Support to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** Operations include the provision of specialized assistance to respond to a terrorist threat or incident. A unique C2 structure is in place for this type of DSO. The US Joint Forces Command’s Joint Task Force Civil-Support (JTF-CS) will have OPCON of all designated DOD assets in support of the LFA. A military response to these categories of domestic emergencies might include Crisis Management, Consequence Management, and/or Technical Operations. These types of responses might take place sequentially, simultaneously, or independently of each other.

⁴ The *Federal Response Plan* is a document signed by 27 Federal departments and agencies, including DoD. It details how Federal assistance is coordinated and delivered in support of State and local governments for disaster or emergency. It serves as a model and supplements other Federal emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards

- **Crisis Management** response involves measures taken to resolve a hostile situation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law.
- **Consequence Management** response involves measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies.
- **Technical Operations** involve measures to address aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials. They may include assistance in identifying and assessing threats of hazardous materials, providing consultation to decision makers, or providing decontamination assistance.

Marine forces have been employed in DSO in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, riots in Los Angeles, wildfires in the western US, and Hurricane Andrew in Florida. The Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) also has a significant role in response to WMD.

III. MAGTF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Prevent War, Win Battles, Secure Peace

Marine Civil Affairs (CA) forces are specially trained and organized to support the MAGTF commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct civil-military operations (CMO). CA Marines support every MAGTF mission throughout the full range of military operations, from Theater Engagement efforts to Major Theater War, and help the commander to fully consider the civil implications of his military mission. They are an essential asset to effective CMO by virtue of their training and experience in civil-military relations, area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, and civilian professional skills. As special staff, CA Marines are the commander's principle advisors on the spectrum of relations between the MAGTF and a wide variety of civilians and civilian organizations. This may range from Community Relations projects during port visits to Dislocated Civilian operations conducted in support of combat operations.

Terminology:

- **Civil Affairs** describes designated active and reserve forces and units organized, trained and equipped to conduct civil affairs activities and to support CMO. "Civil Affairs" is *neither a mission nor an objective, but a name* for designated personnel and units. USMC CA forces are principally designed to support CMO.
- **Civil Affairs Activities** describe actions performed or supported by CA forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government. USMC CA forces have a limited capability to conduct civil affairs activities.

CA personnel are both "Planners" and "Doers". As planners, they consider the impact that civilians will have on military operations, and the impact that operations will have on civilians. They help the commander to accurately envision and efficiently achieve his desired endstate, ensuring the consideration of factors not often considered in the training environment. Like the other members of the staff, the CA planner brings a particular orientation and an expertise to the process of analyzing the mission, developing and selecting courses of action (COAs), preparing operation orders or plans, and transitioning them to those tasked with execution. As always, the CA planner works to facilitate military operations, minimize civilian interference, and assist the commander to meet his legal and moral obligations to civilians within his area of influence.

As operators, CA personnel also help the MAGTF commander to accomplish his assigned mission. They make assessments and gather information in the field, directly supervise portions of operations, coordinate with a wide variety of civil and military organizations, and provide advice to supported subordinate military commanders or civilian authorities. They coordinate local labor efforts, locate HN resources and coordinate for their usage, close Information Requirements, provide operational law assistance to the SJA and help process claims and support MAGTF Information Operations. In every case, CA personnel support the military commander in the accomplishment of his mission: the benefit to any other groups or populations is always secondary to support for the Marine commander.

MAGTF Civil Affairs Forces

Civil Affairs Groups

Marine CA forces are primarily organized into Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), each designed to support a warfighting MEF. CA forces require skills that are not typically otherwise found in military units, including those typically found in civilian government. Because of the requirement for these specialized skills, reservists form the bulk of CA forces within DOD: all Marine Corps CA structure is currently resident in the Reserve Component (RC). The CAGs are Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units assigned to Commander Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES/ MARFORRES) prior to activation. They also provide sub-units and personnel for service with the operating forces prior to mobilization of the Group. The CAGs reinforce the active forces, providing a capability that the MAGTF does not otherwise possess. There are currently two CAGs, each of which is regionally oriented to the AORs of the MEFs they support. The Third Civil Affairs Group (3d CAG) supports I and III MEFs, and would support a MAGTF assigned to USPACOM or USCENTCOM. The Fourth Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) supports II MEF and would support operating forces assigned to USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, or USJFCOM. The CAGs are mutually supporting, providing each other Marines with particular skills and availability as operations require. The CAG is considered organic to the MEF upon activation: unlike US Army CA units provided by USSOCOM, the CAGs are neither designated as special operations forces nor separately apportioned under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

Army CA Forces

The vast majority of US CA assets are in the US Army, soon to total some 6,000 soldiers. The Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has combatant command authority of all US Army CA forces stationed in the US, and provides CA forces in support of the warfighting CINCs. A single Active Component (AC) unit, the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne), provides some 250 CA generalists for immediate deployment worldwide. The AC Bn provides rapid deployment, short-duration CA support for non-mobilization contingency operations. It is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA functional specialty skills. Instead, it gives a supported commander an initial capability to assess the situation, to develop a CMO estimate of the situation, and to recommend the deployment of more specialized personnel, often reservists. Each Company in the Bn is regionally oriented to support one of the warfighting CINCs.

The remainder of US Army CA forces, some 95% of the total, are in the Reserve Component (RC) and are organized to provide tailored support to strategic, operational, and tactical commanders. Within USSOCOM, there are four regionally oriented CA Commands (CACOMS), each aligned in "wartrace" to a geographic CINC. The CACOM provides support at the unified, sub-unified, or theater component command level. When deployed, the CACOM Commander is the geographic CINCs senior CA advisor. The CACOM is staffed with highly skilled functional specialists task-organized into Government, Public Facilities, Economic/Commerce, and Special Functions Teams. Each CACOM is assigned a number of CA Brigades, which support JTF or corps-level commanders. Finally, CA Battalions are assigned to the CA Brigades, and support brigade to division level commanders. These organizations are additive: CA Commands, Brigades, and Battalions would be deployed to fight a Major Theater War (MTW).

CA Functions

Marine CA forces are multi-purpose forces, equipped with particular skills, expertise and experience that the MAGTF can apply to all of its operations across the spectrum. Their focus, the relations between the MAGTF and civilians, requires them to interact with every element of the staff, and potentially with every Marine in the MAGTF. Primarily, they enhance the MAGTFs ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO by providing capabilities that focus on the following functions:

- Provide tailored CA support to the MAGTF, its major subordinate elements, and other organizations as the MAGTF commander directs.

- Provide cultural and social expertise, supplemental regional and political awareness ⁵and advice on issues relating to the civil populace in support of all MAGTF military operations,
- Assist the commander to plan, coordinate, and execute MAGTF CMO, to include Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Population and Resource Control, Nation Assistance Operations, Military Civic Action, Domestic Support Operations, and limited Civil Administration,
- Assist the commander to plan, prepare, and train MAGTF forces in the support of CMO,
- Provide dedicated forces prepared to assess civil sector functions,
- Coordinate MAGTF operations with interagency, NGO, IO, and FN civilian organizations,
- Support MAGTF Information Operations, including PSYOP,
- Provide limited functional specialty expertise,
- Supplement the intelligence effort,

"SOF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area, to include geographic, political, social, economic, informational, military, and environmental conditions. For some missions, SOF operators must also know the language, customs, and ethnic and religious affiliations and antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution. This level of area orientation is best achieved through previous operational experience, MTTs, deployments for training in the area or, at a minimum, intensive pre-employment study of the intended operational area."
 -Joint Pub 3-05 *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*

CA Activities and Functional Specialties

CA forces have particular skills that are otherwise not typically found among other military forces. Some of these skills are most often found in civil government. These unique CA competencies are known as "functional specialty" skills, and may be acquired through training, education, and often through the civilian employment positions of reserve military personnel. Joint and Army doctrine identifies 16 of these functional specialties: Army CA units that support strategic and other Joint Force Commanders are organized to provide each of these skills. In fact, US Army MOSs provide Additional Skill Indicators to identify CA soldiers qualified to serve as functional specialists within Civil Affairs Commands and Brigades, and organizes them into four specialty teams. All CA personnel are qualified to help military forces plan, coordinate, and execute CMO: only functional specialists can perform the more specialized Civil Affairs Activities.

⁵ Foreign and Regional Area Officers (FAOs/RAOs) provide the MAGTF with the greatest degree of expertise in the political and social specifics of a country or region. However, qualified FAOs/RAOs may be serving in CA billets.

US Army CA Functional Specialties

<p><u>Government Function Team</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal • Public Administration • Public Education • Public Health • Public Safety 	<p><u>Economic Function Team</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian Supply • Economic Development • Food & Agriculture
<p><u>Public Facilities Function Team</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Communications • Transportation • Public Works & Utilities 	<p><u>Special Function Team</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Information • Cultural Relations • Dislocated Civilians • Emergency Services • Environmental Management

MAGTF CA Functional Specialties

Marine CA forces are not required to plan and conduct CMO at the strategic level (though they may execute CMO to support strategic objectives in the MAGTF's Area of Responsibility). The MAGTF cannot perform military government with organic assets. The MAGTF will assume civil sector responsibilities only as a last resort, and will transition them to the Joint Force or civilian authorities as rapidly as possible. Therefore all CA Marines are considered "generalists" (as are many Army CA billets, including all of those within CA Battalions). The Civil Affairs Groups and Civil Affairs Detachments are organized to perform a limited number of CA functional specialties⁶, however, that may be required to support MAGTF operations, especially during sustained operations ashore. These skills are obtained through training and education: no particular civilian occupation is required for MOS qualification. When additional functional specialty skills are required to support operations, the CA officer recommends that the MAGTF commander request such support via the Joint Force Commander. At the same time, the CAGs make every effort to recruit and retain Marines with a wide variety of civilian skills, enabling the Group to task-organize and provide broad support to the MAGTF.

⁶ These functions are often referred to as "sectors" by coalition forces and civil organizations, including IO/NGOs/

Primary

- Dislocated Civilians
- Cultural Relations
- Public Safety
- Civilian Supply
- Civil Information
- Legal
- Public Health

Limited

- Public Works and Utilities
- Public Communications

MAGTF CA Functional Specialty Capabilities

The Civil Affairs Groups and Detachments have the following functional specialty capabilities:

Dislocated Civilians

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities, including locations and movement within the MAGTF AO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs in support of CMO. Supervise MAGTF planning and operation of DC camps,
- Plan movement control measures, emergency care, evacuation of DCs. Coordinate provision of transportation, military police support, military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical services as required.
- Advise the commander on legal and moral responsibilities with respect to DCs in accordance with policy and US and international law.

Cultural Relations

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on CMO.
- Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the FN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
- Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.

- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.
- Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. Government assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

Public Safety

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

Civilian Supply

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Determine the availability of local supplies.
- Identify private and public property available for military use.

- Coordinate the use of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
- Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

Civil Information

- Advise and assist in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support government administration, CMO, and the “single voice” message.
- Advise, assist, develop plans, and provide operational oversight and supervision in the employment of civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, TV, print, and newspaper), both public and private.
- Assist PSYOP forces in planning, developing, and disseminating proclamations, ordinances, and notices.
- Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.
- Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

International Law

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes, and statutes.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.
- Assist the SJA in educating and training U.S. personnel in the FN legal system, obligations, and consequences.
- Advise and assist the SJA in international law issues.
- Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise local FN judicial agencies.
- Conduct liaison and monitor the local FN judiciary system to deconflict differences in administration of laws, agreements, and policies.

Public Health

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

- Coordinate the use of FN government and private health resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation). If one considers a HADR, there are adequate Preventive Medicine assets for this configuration. If one considers a combat situation and the preventive medicine need is increased, there are alternate preventive medicine assets that can be requested through the chain of command from either the MEF Surgeon (G-4 Med) or from the PM assets in the Medical Battalion (FSSG). These not being adequate, there are 4 preventive medicine units globally that can provide not only PM assets, but also other epidemiological and preventive medicine resources.

Limited CA functional specialty capabilities.

Marine CA personnel also have a limited capability in other functional specialties, obtained through training and education. These skills are primarily focused on performing initial assessments of the functions, which permits initial planning and identifies the need for further expertise. This additional expertise will most often come from outside the MAGTF. It may be provided by functional specialists sourced from US Army CA forces, but may also be provided by other US Government Agencies, or even through coordination with International, Nongovernmental, or Host Nation organizations.

Public Works and Utilities

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Public Communications

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public communications resources to support government administration and CMO.


Concept of Organization

The CAG is composed of elements that can be task-organized to provide tailored support to a supported MAGTF or other headquarters.

Civil Affairs Group The CAG is the CA force assigned to a deployed MEF. The CAG is organized with a Group Headquarters and a number of Civil Affairs Detachments. The Group HQ is organized into a Command Section and Staff Sections, along with Communications, Motor Transport, and Public Health Sections. The Group HQ provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF CE, as well as command and control of subordinate CA elements. In garrison, the CAG HQ is responsible for training and equipping subordinate elements, preparing them for deployment, and coordinating their support to the operating forces. It maintains continuous communications with supported MEFs, advising the MEF commander and ensuring that plans, exercises, and operations include appropriate CA and CMO concerns. The CAG is organized to perform all of the required functional specialties and therefore can perform CA Activities

Civil Affairs Detachment A CA Detachment supports the MEB or a Major Subordinate Command of the MEF. The CA Detachment is organized with a Detachment headquarters, several functional specialty teams, and one or more general purpose CA Teams. While all CA forces can assist the MAGTF to plan, coordinate, and execute CMO, the CA Detachment is the smallest element that can execute the more specialized CA Activities without reinforcement.

Civil Affairs Team A CA Team supports the Marine Expeditionary Unit or Major Subordinate Element of the MEB. The CA Team is organized to help the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO, and cannot support the full range of Marine functional specialties.



Staff, Administrative and Logistics Capabilities

- Administration

The CAG is capable of limited self-administration. The Group Headquarters prepares correspondence and maintains service records for assigned personnel.

- Intelligence

The CAG's Intelligence section supports the planning and coordination of CMO. It carefully considers the civil dimension of the battlefield as well as enemy capabilities and intentions to execute their own CMO or to counter MAGTF efforts. This perspective is especially useful as the MAGTF intelligence effort may be predominantly focused on supporting operations and Force Protection. The Intelligence section serves as the MAGTF CA Officer's conduit to the intelligence process, responding to his intelligence requirements. These requirements may be closed via Requests for Information forwarded to the MAGTF Intelligence section and, when necessary, beyond. They are also closed within the CAG itself, as the MAGTF CA Officer directs his CA assets to gather specific information for further processing and production into useful intelligence.

- Operations and Training

The Operations section is responsible

- Maintenance

The CAG can perform 2d and limited 3d echelon maintenance on all assigned equipment.

- Motor Transport

The CAG has sufficient Motor Transport assets to move the Group in a single lift and can perform second-echelon maintenance on assigned vehicles. Motor Transport personnel are organized to support Detachments and Teams that are separated from the Group. Vehicles are employed only for command and control and transport of the unit itself: the

MAGTF CSSE must provide additional Motor Transport in support of CMO when required, such as transport of Dislocated Civilians or Humanitarian Assistance materials. Ideally, efficient CMO planning will arrange for non-MAGTF vehicles whenever possible in order to minimize the use of military resources.

- Supply

The CAG supply section conducts organic supply equipment. It may also be required to exercise control of property and consumables acquired from civil sources that may be useful in CMO

CA Personnel

The majority of billets in a CAG are structured for Civil Affairs Officers or Civil Affairs NCOs, both additional MOSs. Each builds on the Marine's FMF experience with a variety of specialized training and education. Many of the individuals serving in a CAG also have specialized experience in fields such as government administration, emergency management, and public facilities operations. While the CAGs actively look for and recruit such Marines, no MOS or billet distinctions on a Marine T/O&E require such proficiency. Instead, the CAGs seek Marines with a wide variety of Primary MOSs and experience, both civil and military, assigning them to create balanced elements that can support MAGTF operations.

All CA Marines are generalists. Like Army CA generalists, Marines provide multi-purpose support to the commander, planning and executing CMO and CA activities in support of the MAGTF. They may also execute more specialized CMO and CA activities as planned at the unified or sub-unified level and adapted to the MAGTF mission. As the situation requires, they recommend the deployment of functional specialists to support the MAGTF.

- Training

Whenever possible, Marines assigned to CA billets train alongside their Army counterparts, attending the same formal schools and using the same correspondence courses. Marines assigned to functional specialty teams will require additional training and education to perform their duties. Skill in additional languages is also of great value, as the CAGs are not normally staffed with interpreters. Perhaps more importantly, accomplishment in other languages often indicates an ability to more easily adapt and orient upon other cultures and peoples. Finally Marine CA forces also ensure they are skilled planners, able to rapidly integrate with the MAGTF staff upon deployment.

MAGTF CA Operations

Concept of Employment

Marine Corps Civil Affairs forces reinforce the MAGTF CE with specially trained and organized personnel in order to assist the commander in the planning, coordination and execution of CMO and **tactical PSYOP** in support of the MAGTF mission. The CAG is a MEF-level asset, along with units such as the communications battalion, radio battalion, the intelligence battalion, and the force reconnaissance company. It is activated in its entirety to support a deployed MEF. Upon activation, the CAG is under the Administrative Control (ADCON) of the MEF Headquarters Group, while the MEF

commander continues to directly exercise Operations Control (OPCON). Prior to activation, the CAG is under the command of COMMARFORRES, who provides forces for service with the active forces. While COMMARFORRES may exercise command and control of the CAGs through one of its Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) in order to facilitate, administration, and support of the Groups, CA forces are always employed at the CE of the supported MAGTF for operations.

Concept of Support

- Preplanned

Even as Reserve Component (RC) units, the CAGs provide continuous and worldwide support to the operating forces. Much of this support is prior to any activation of the unit. CA Marines support both preplanned events and contingencies, generally in an incremental fashion. Preplanned events include operations in support of theater engagement strategies, as well as exercises held by Marine, Joint and Combined commanders. The CAGs support deliberate planning efforts for OPLANs and CONPLANs as well as exercise development. They provide expertise to formal schools and to the development and review of doctrinal publications. A variety of orders and authorization processes are used for preplanned support. Occasionally, even "Inactive Duty for Training" periods, usually called drills, can be devoted to types of CA support. With sufficient advance notice, Annual Training (AT) periods, generally two weeks in length, can be scheduled to provide appropriate support. When support is required for longer periods, a number of overlapping AT increments might be planned, providing continuous support to the commander. Specific missions also may be authorized with Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) orders, which are generally limited to 179 days in a fiscal year but may be much shorter in duration. ADSW orders are especially useful for regular commitments, such as billets continuously involved in theater engagement.

Active Component (AC) forces may often shift exercise and operations times and locations according to changes in situation or the commander's priorities. This can jeopardize preplanned CA deployments, however, and may result in degraded support to the MAGTF. CAG members have external requirements including employers and families who may not be able to respond quickly to schedule changes. The staff members of the Groups themselves have restrictions on their availability and may be widely separated from each other between scheduled training periods. The coordination of funding and generation of new orders may also present delays. Often the CAGs can adapt to changes in requirements: the earlier they are informed of changes they more effectively they can adjust.

Predeployment exercises, such as the MEU(SOC) workups, are prioritized for support. Supporting CA elements conduct staff integration and exercise the Marine Corps Planning Process with MAGTFs they will support during contingencies. These dedicated CA forces might then schedule limited deployments overseas for important training events. At their best, these preplanned exercises and operations serve as rehearsals that facilitate contingency support.

- Contingency

Unlike many other SMCR units, the CAG provides a reinforcing capability to the active forces: one that otherwise the MAGTF does not have. This places significant demands upon the Groups. MAGTF commanders may envision the need to conduct CMO during

the course of deployments and operations. When CA assistance is desired, RC support will be required, even before any mobilization begins. The CAGs are routinely prepared, however, to provide immediate support to MAGTFs engaged in contingency operations, generally within less than 72 hours. CA support to a deployed MAGTF is by echelon. By SOP each CAG maintains an element, usually a full CA Team, ready for immediate deployment. Ideally, at least the CA Team Commander has exercised with the MAGTF which requests reinforcement. Members volunteer for assignment, and might receive ADSW orders covering the initial period of an operation. The CAG next reconstitutes a deployment team and begins to provide support to the deployed echelon by reachback. This support might include cultural, economic, or political research, and authorized coordination with US-based organizations. Later increments of the CAG might be subject to involuntary activation such as Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC). Finally, entire Groups may be mobilized in support of a deployed MEF. It is important to consider that CA Marines will often deploy prior to full mobilization of other reserve forces and to prepare Marines and processes accordingly.

As SMCR units, CA elements often join the MAGTF later than preferred and with only basic Situational Awareness (SA). As an Enabling or an Initial Entry Force, the MAGTF itself is often committed early to an operation or during a contingency. The CA officer has a substantial challenge to begin assisting the MAGTF commander and preparing his own force for mission planning and execution. It is vital that he prioritize the CA forces' efforts in order to rapidly and effectively integrate with the MAGTF.

Civil Affairs Forces Solve Problems

In 1965, the commander of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines had a problem. Lt Col William Taylor was assigned a mission that might be given to a Marine unit tomorrow morning, commanding one of the first ground units deployed to Viet Nam and charged with defending a forward airbase at Phu Bai. Lt Col Taylor's problem was that thousands of people lived within his Area of Operations, inhabiting known VC villages within mortar range of the airstrip, and he didn't have the strength to constantly occupy all of this 10 square-mile area. 3/4's Civil Affairs officer, Captain John Mullin had an idea to help solve his commander's problem. He thought it might be possible to work with the local militia, known as the Popular Forces or "PF's" to provide a constant presence in each hamlet, but the PF's were poorly trained, ill-equipped, completely lacking in motivation. Capt Mullin's idea, integrating Marine infantry squads with PF platoons and greatly increasing the size of the area a single infantry battalion could control, eventually became known as the Combined Action Program. Marines in Combined Action Platoons lived together with the Vietnamese, eating, sleeping, fighting and sometimes dying together. The Marines were trained in Vietnamese culture and traditions, sent to language classes whenever possible, and made it a point to salute Vietnamese officers and colors. They developed civic action programs, and began to work with organizations such as USAID, with NGOs, and even with some of the small allied military units in Viet Nam.

The VC never regained control of a single village that had a CAP platoon, and a number of inventive leaders began to recommend the Combined Action concept as the only realistic way to fight and win the war in Viet Nam. Eventually the Marine Corps drew down the number of Marines assigned to the Combined Action units. At its height, however, there were almost 100 CAP platoons, two thousand Marines at a time working all across the Marine Area of Operations in Viet Nam, and organized into a force composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Combined Action Groups.

IV. CMO Integration

To achieve anything beyond the most marginal effect the civil implications of the operation cannot be merely added to military operations as an afterthought; they must be considered continuously and throughout. CMO must be integrated into military operations from the original tasking, through planning, and into execution.

Command and Control

- The Civil Affairs Officer

The MAGTF CA officer is normally the commanding officer of the CAG, detachment commander of the CA Detachment, or team leader of a CA Team when assigned, and is dual-hatted with both command and staff responsibilities. The CA officer supports the commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct MAGTF civil-military operations (CMO) both personally and by directing the operations of MAGTF CA forces. He has the responsibility to enhance the relationship between the MAGTF, civil authorities, and civilian populations in order to ensure the success of the MAGTF's assigned mission. In garrison, his principle responsibility is to organize, train, and equip tailored forces for support to deployed MAGTFs

The CA commander's first responsibility will be to advise the commander and support his planning effort. Next, he helps to coordinate CMO with other the military CA forces and the civilian organizations involved. Finally, his force may need to execute CA Activities when the MAGTF requires functional expertise. In order to do any of this well, the CA force needs to swiftly develop a comprehensive understanding of both the military and civil dimensions of the situation. The CA section continuously disseminates this understanding in order to prepare forces that may follow on and augment his efforts or even relieve him in place. Perhaps most importantly, they bring a different perspective to the Marine Corps Planning Process. While other members of the staff look 'inward' to the battlespace, the CA Marine looks outward.

The civil affairs officer normally operates under the staff cognizance of the Operations Officer. However, in situations in which civil-military considerations are a priority, such as the conduct of humanitarian operations or upon consolidation of an objective with a substantial civilian population, the CMO effort may be a priority to the MAGTF commander. At these times, the MAGTF commander may choose to designate the CA officer as a member of the general/executive staff. At same time, the bulk of CA efforts focus on the planning of operations and preparations for likely turns of events. At the MEU or SPMAGTF or in an MSE, future planning is the responsibility of the S-3. At the MARFOR, MEF, and MEB level the G-5 is the principal staff assistant for all future planning and joint planning matters. In any case, it is vital that assigned CA forces provide support to these Plans functions as well as to the conduct of Operations. Like any other commander, the CA officer positions himself from where he can best influence the action. As the CA officer primarily does this through his role as a planner and advisor, typically he places himself so as to best support the MAGTF planning effort. The civil affairs officer's duties include the following responsibilities:

- Serves as a member of the Battlestaff
- Advises the commander of the potential civilian impact on military operations

- Advises the commander concerning the potential impact of military operations on civilian populations
- Advising the commander on the employment of other military units and USG assets that can perform or assist CMO
- Assists the commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations under his control
- Serves as the commander's principle interface with external non-military agencies that may be operating within his area of operations. This will normally include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and other US Government (USG) and foreign government agencies.
- Advises the commander of changes in the political environment which may change the military situation⁷
- Identifies CMO goals and objectives to support the mission and the JFC's intent, and develops plans to achieve them
- Employ CA forces to support effective command and control and the scheme of maneuver

US Army formations designate CMO as a functional area led by one of the Coordinating Staff officers. This principle staff officer is designated as the G/S-5, and is responsible for all matters concerning CMO. USA units authorize the G/S-5 at all echelons from battalion to corps: the billet is actually staffed only at division and corps level until a smaller unit actually deploys. In many cases, the G/S-5 is a CA officer by training and MOS. Upon assignment to an Army command, USA/R CA units provide integrated/full spectrum support to the G/S-5.

Currently, all Marine Corps civil affairs units reside in the Reserve establishment. As CA officers may not be deployed with MEUs and SPMAGTFs, school-trained personnel in the active force may provide a limited civil affairs capability. In the conduct of joint operations, other-Service augmentation of the Marine Corps civil affairs capability may be requested via the Joint Force Commander. When trained CA personnel are not immediately available, the commander may designate a member of the staff to undertake the function. This individual is the person who constantly considers:

- 1) What will civilians do?
- 2) What do we want them to do?
- 3) How can the MAGTF encourage this to happen?
- 4) What does the MAGTF need to know in order to make this happen?

⁷ When supporting a MAGTF without an assigned Political Advisor.

Command and Control Nodes

CMO is a function of the command and control process. Therefore, it is critical to have CA personnel at each of the “nodes” which exercise C2 of the MAGTF. Throughout, command and control is a center of gravity for CA efforts.

“Personalities often are more important than processes.
You need the right people in the right places.”
-Gen A.C. Zinni, USMC

- Command Element (CE)

Marine CA primarily facilitates CMO by assisting the MAGTF commander to plan and coordinate efforts for other elements of the MAGTF to execute. Therefore, CA support is initially assigned to the MAGTF CE. Upon activation of the entire CAG, the MEF Commander retains Operational Control (OpCon), and typically exercises Administrative Control (ADCON) through the MEF Headquarters Group (MHG) commander. CA Detachments and Teams support MEBs and MEUs in a similar fashion. As the situation dictates, the CA element may be tasked-organized to more directly support other elements of the MAGTF, usually for particular phases of an operation and for a limited duration. The Operations Officer has primary responsibility for CMO at the CE, and has staff cognizance over CA efforts. As the MAGTF Operations and Plans staff sections organize for combat, they form Integrated Staff Sections (ISCs). CA Personnel support each of the ISCs and the Battlestaff.

Battlestaff Responsibilities

The Battlestaff consists of the principal staff officers, AC/S G-1 through G-6 and designated Special Staff, including the MAGTF CA officer. The Battlestaff members are the MEF Commander's primary advisers. They will closely monitor the areas under their staff cognizance, and provide detailed recommendations, information and analysis to the Future Plans and Future Operations Cells. As a member of the Battlestaff, the MAGTF CA Officer:

- Assists the commander in developing and then achieving his vision for operations
- Integrates CA and CMO concerns into plans and operations
- Recommends intelligence requirements to the G-2
- Manages the commander's interface with interagency, NGO, IO, and FN civil agencies
- Plans, directs, and supervises MEF CA liaisons to external commands
- Monitors the battle

Future Plans Cell (FutPlns)

The FutPlns cell, chaired by the AC/S G-5 and including representatives of the Battlestaff, MSCs and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), conducts detailed planning for the

MEF's next mission. FutPlns will normally construct the MEF's Campaign Plan and establish timelines and phases. They will work closely with MEF HHQ's FutPlns to ensure that the MEF is assigned adequate resources and appropriate battlespace for the anticipated mission. FutPlns ensures the MEF plan for the current campaign and future battle is synchronized with the supported CINC's and the Component Commander's intent and compliments the other components/adjacent command's plans. FutPlns' focus is to keep the MEF from reaching a culminating point. CA support to the FutPlns cell includes:

- Construct the MAGTF Campaign plan, shaping conditions for the next battle
- Identify and coordinate for additional resources to support CMO, including CA functional specialists and other Subject Matter Experts
- Synchronize CMO with the CINC's intent and with other components, including establishing liaison
- Develop Support Requirement Plans (?) from higher and adjacent commands,
- Establish a planning relationship with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs as appropriate,
- Plan CMO support to transition and redeployment plans

Future Operations (FutOps)

The FutOps Cell, under the direction of the AC/S G-3, is chaired by the G-3 Future Operations Officer and includes representatives of the Battlestaff, MSCs and SMEs. Future Operations conducts detailed planning for MSC's next mission change. The FutOps cell focuses on new frag order/change to the mission for the MSC's elements and forms and leads the integrated planning effort. CA support to the FutOps cell includes:

- Participate in the integrated planning effort
- Develop/recommend CCIRS and PIRs
- Develop briefs, slides, and decision aids which provide a basis for command decisions
- Develop OpOrders and Frag Orders
- Prepare supporting plans including the Annex G "Civil Affairs"
- Coordinate with the G-5 to obtain external USG, CINC, and Service support
- Interact with the Force Fires Coordinator and the MEF Target Board

Current Operations (CurOps)


CurOps also includes Current Intelligence, Current Fires, and representatives of the Battlestaff. Under the direction of the AC/S G-3, the Current Operations Officer coordinates the current battle and ensures adherence to the MEF Commander's Intent. CA support to CurOps includes:

- Execute the Plan
- Direct assignment of CA support to subordinate elements
- Monitor the battle, including the CMO component of the operation

- Analyze, interpret, assess battlespace events and information from a CMO perspective
- Provide information for command decisions
- Coordinate and assist development of the FragO to adjust the current plan
- Assess CCIR collection

Civil Affairs Operations Cell

The MAGTF CA officer may determine that a distinct CA Ops Cell is the most efficient means to support all of the MAGTFs Integrated Staff Cells. The CA Ops Cell is located in the Future Operations Cell, which leads the MAGTF's integrated planning effort. It is useful when limited personnel and facilities prevent the assignment of dedicated CA elements to each of the ISCs. Instead, the CA Ops Cell performs the majority of CA planning in a central location, while providing representation in each of the ISCs as continuously as possible. The CA officer continues to provide comprehensive support to the Battlestaff. The CA Ops Cell is not a location for interface with organizations or persons external to the MAGTF: this interface takes place primarily in the CMOC.



CA Ops Cell Tasks

- Develops concepts and plans for CMO in support of the MAGTF mission in order to gain and maintain public understanding, good will, and support
- Directing assigned CA forces in order to support the Future Plans, Future Operations, and Current Operations Integrated Staff Cells (ISCs)
- Recommend CMO related IR and EEFI to the G-2


- Provides the G-2 with information gained from civilians in the area of operations
- Provides for limited civil administration of areas under the commanders control
- Prepares and coordinates Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPLAN/OPORD
- Advises the commander on the employment of military units in support of civil affairs programs.
- Assists the G-4 in identifying local goods, services, and facilities available to support military operations, including civilian medical capabilities
- Assists the G-4 and the medical officer in identifying the basic needs of the civilian population in terms of emergency food, shelter, and health care and developing programs to satisfy those needs
- Coordinates with the staff judge advocate on the rules of engagement as applied to civilians in the area of operations; recommends changes to the commander as necessary to ensure that, to the extent that the tactical situation permits, civilian personal, cultural, and property rights are safeguarded
- Coordinates with the comptroller and the staff judge advocate to facilitate the identification, recording, and payment of claims for compensation for death, personal injury, or property damage
- Plans and implements, in coordination with the provost marshal and staff judge advocate, necessary emergency population control measures to support rear area security, maintain law and order, and minimize civilian interference with combat operations (Such measures may include relocations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)
- Establishes and operates a CMOC for the commander in order to maintain liaison with and coordinate the operations of other U.S. government agencies, host nation civil authorities, International and Nongovernmental organizations in the area of operations
- Recommend Protected Targets to the FFC for forwarding to the JTF J-3/Fires
- Plans, in coordination with the public affairs officer, public affairs and community relations programs supporting civil affairs goals and objectives and focused on gaining and maintaining public understanding, goodwill, and support
- Provide for liaison with CA/CMO elements at higher and adjacent headquarters as required.
- Support MAGTF Info Ops, to include PSYOP and PA efforts
- Assist the G-1 with coordination for local labor resources
- Recommends H/CA in support of the MAGTF commanders directed engagement efforts

Other C2 nodes for CA

"When the United States undertakes military operations, the U.S. Armed Forces are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military.... For example, there is a constant, often urgent need to coordinate the various aspects of the informational instruments of national security strategy: public affairs, psychological operations, and public diplomacy."
 Joint Pub 1 *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*


The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

The MAGTF CA element also operates the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Sometimes referred to by other names, **the CMOC is the focal point for coordination and planning between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations. It is not the location at which the CA element plans MAGTF CMO**⁸. The CMOC does not establish policy or give direction to the MAGTF, but relays information and recommendations to the ISCs. External organizations which coordinate at the CMOC might include other US Government (USG) Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and a variety of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). With their specialized training and focus, CA personnel are the primary interface between the MAGTF and other non-military organizations. CA personnel ensure that effective coordination and the highest degree possible of inter-agency planning is achieved, even when the CMOC is no more formal than the seats of a tactical vehicle.



⁸ Availability of facilities may result in CA planning being conducted in the same physical location as an established CMOC, but these are two separate functions.

The MAGTF CA staff directs the operation of the CMOC under the guidance of the MAGTF CA Officer. When relationships with civilian organizations require the most senior representation of the commander, a Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, or Executive Officer may be designated as the CMOC Director. It should be staffed with a number of functional representatives of the MAGTF, providing “one-stop shopping” for external organizations. The CMOC must be organized to promote information exchange between participating organizations. Often, this will include facilitating coordination between various external agencies, which otherwise will have no mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Whenever possible, the MAGTF can help to identify civilian capabilities that can satisfy civilian requirements, avoiding the use of MAGTF resources entirely. It is critical that the CMOC provide real value to the organizations that meet there, or they will decide not to do so.




The JFC's CA Staff

A regionally oriented CA staff provided by USSOCOM will support the JFC. US Army Civil Affairs Commands will support CinCs. This staff will develop the CinCs' policy for CMO and CA Activities, which the MAGTF will then support at the Operational and Tactical levels. The MAGTF CA staff will require a linkage, possibly including liaison, to this staff.

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Depending upon the mission, the JFC may consolidate of assets capable of performing unique CMO under one subordinate JTF, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). Potentially, and with appropriate augmentation, the MAGTF may be assigned as the JCMOTF. Whenever an element is established which has CMO responsibilities and authority across the JOA, the MAGTF CA section must establish linkages, possibly including liaison.



Reachback

Much of the information needed to advise the commander and support CMO planning can be provided to the MAGTF via reachback. This process collects, checks, and deconflicts information from a location in the rear and pushes material forward in a usable format for use in the field. Reachback minimizes the footprint of forces deployed in the AO and takes advantage of substantial information resources not available in the field. It also takes advantage of better communication methods, including face-to-face coordination, between Marines and external organizations that might not be available in an expeditionary environment. Deployed MAGTF CA forces can be supported by the CAGs and by MCIA via reachback. Similarly, CA forces at sea can take advantage of the C4 capabilities of amphibious shipping to push targeted information to CA forces ashore.

Staff Integration

“Operations or events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas and events, therefore the commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. The single-battle concept allows the commander to effectively focus the efforts of all the elements of the force to accomplish the mission.”
- MCWP *Marine Corps Planning Process*

The primary concern for effective CMO is that every Marine responsible for command and control of the MAGTF consider the civil dimensions of operations. Whenever possible, the assigned CA forces take the lead in facilitating this consideration.

Immediately upon assignment, the CA force’s priority is staff integration. The following are examples of the functional issues that require coordination with CMO, even when CA personnel are not available to effect it:

Supported Commander

The Marine commander establishes the requirement to consider the civil implications of his military mission throughout his command. **He actively considers CMO as part of his single-battle concept**, will drive the planning process to integrate CMO, and will use civil-military input as part of his decision making process during the course of the battle. He will use CMO to expand the selection of capabilities he can apply to his mission and minimize the friction that otherwise would slow his OpTempo.

Personnel

The Personnel section includes CMO considerations as it establishes appropriate standards of conduct for MAGTF personnel in relation to the local civilian population. CA personnel will facilitate and provide expertise to develop MAGTF policy regarding the recruitment, hiring, and payment of civilian workers. MP operations under the control of the Personnel Officer and CMO are also mutually supportive, especially when integrated with HN security forces.

Intelligence

CMO is both a consumer of intelligence and a provider of information. Information of value to the MAGTF commander will be available through the intellectual, operational, experiential, medical and cultural resources found in government agencies, NGOs, commercial interests, academia and across the entire spectrum of technology. CA forces can help to facilitate obtaining this information. Typically the Information Requirements of CMO will challenge the Intelligence process, as the process is most often exercised in terms of enemy capabilities and intent. During certain operations, however, intelligence about civil factors may be essential to the commander, such as the identification of key civilian leaders, their support for US operations, and means by which they might be influenced. CA forces must interact with the intelligence cycle, in part by recommending Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) to the commander. CMO also produces information that must be provided to the Intelligence Cycle. This

information will be come part of the commander's personal Situational Awareness. It will also be forwarded to Higher Headquarters, adding to the common operational picture shared by all elements of the Joint Force.

The Intelligence function must be prepared to provide information, if not intelligence, to a number of civilian agencies. This information will be critical in gaining the cooperation of organizations that have no requirement to accept our direction. Providing information is one of the means by which we demonstrate that working with the MAGTF is to the benefit of the various agencies, and thereby gain their cooperation.

Intelligence must contain aspects related to political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships as well as enemy and friendly forces and target specific data. "

-Joint Pub 3-05 *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*

Counter-Intelligence (CI)

CMO and CI are mutually supporting. CMO provides information that CI personnel use to plan and execute HUMINT operations. This might include information on the AO used to develop a "cover story" for CI or reconnaissance personnel. CI personnel must also provide support to the civil-military interface, ensuring that critical information is not made available to any enemy forces. CI participation in the design and operation of the CMOC and of Dislocated Civilian camps is of great value in minimizing the risks of exploitation by the enemy. This will be challenging, as the exchange of information between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external agencies will often be important for mission accomplishment. Generally, a complete banning of information exchange will not be acceptable.

Under exceptional circumstances, CI personnel may participate in CMO. This is most often counter-productive, however, as CMO will be made less effective or impossible if it is seen as a cover for intelligence operations. It also increases the danger to CA personnel, who may be more likely to be targeted if they are perceived as intelligence operatives. Most often CI gains most of the benefit of CMO by conducting periodic and thorough debriefings of personnel involved in CMO.

Operations

By default, the Operations Officer is the MAGTF CMO officer⁹. As with all other MAGTF capabilities, the Operations Officer integrates CMO into the single-battle he manages for the commander. He includes civil concerns in the Estimate of the Situation, just as he does the effects of terrain or weather. Unlike terrain and weather,

⁹ The commander may establish any staff representative, such as the CA officer, as Principle Staff, especially for particular operations or phases of operations.

however, the civil dimension of the battlespace can be influenced, by both ourselves and by our enemies. The Operations Officer ensures that MAGTF operations take maximum advantage of CMO to support mission accomplishment, while minimizing both friction and the negative impact of enemy CMO. It is essential that the MAGTF CA Officer provide concise and considered input to both the commander and the Operations Officer, neither overwhelming them with non-critical information, nor failing to deliver critical inputs.

The Operations Officer must consider the actions of external organizations in the battlespace, many of them civilian. CA forces can help him to understand and integrate the intentions of IO/NGOs and other Government Agencies, primarily through the CMOC.

Fires

MAGTF fire support planners and coordinators must consider CMO. CA forces have most efficient input to Fire Support considerations through the targeting process. The Target List contains those targets the commander intends to engage through supporting arms. There may also be a Protected Target List, consisting of targets requiring special consideration such as religious buildings, schools, or monuments important to the civil populace. The Protected Target List will be published by the JFC and may be NCA directed, and may have LOAC implications. However MAGTF CA forces may also propose Protected Targets to the Fire Support Officer. Measures should be established so that these targets are engaged only when necessary, and with the minimum amount of damage required for mission accomplishment. This may include defining the types of weapons/munitions that can be used on a target. CA Forces may also sit on the Targeting Board as a check against unnecessary engagement of targets that would inflame civilian opinion against the MAGTF, both in the AO and potentially around the world. The MAGTF must also use caution when targeting infrastructure that will be required for successful transition and redeployment of the MAGTF after the conclusion of hostilities.

Force Protection (FP)

FP and CMO are also mutually supporting. Effective CMO enhances the legitimacy of MAGTF operations. It increases the support civilian populations and organizations provide to the MAGTF and decreases the support civilians might provide to threat forces, especially to asymmetric threats. It helps to convince civilian populations to cooperate with MAGTF operations by building the perception the US intervention will benefit the lives of civilians in the AO. FP must also support CMO by helping to train CA and other personnel performing CMO in the safest ways to execute their missions. The MAGTF may also need to assist civilian agencies in developing force protection strategies of their own, even devoting resources to those whose assistance is critical to our success.

Logistics

There are few MAGTF logistics capabilities that cannot be duplicated and expanded upon by civilian organizations, from water purification to line-haul transport. The critical function the MAGTF brings to CMO is most often

command and control, ensuring the effective employment of limited resources in the face of competing demands. When MAGTF assets are used as “muscle”, they should be employed primarily to enable more extensive efforts by external agencies. This facilitation might include efforts such as control of air and seaports, material and cargo handling, or the repair of critical transportation infrastructure. CMO may also facilitate MAGTF access to civilian resources, by identifying sources and providing information on appropriate personal and business practices. This expands the range of operations the commander can support, and enables increased OpTempo. The G/S- 4, in consultation with the MAGTF Surgeon, will also be involved in determining policy for the use of military Health Services capabilities and resources in support of various civilian populations

Plans

The Plans function falls under the staff cognizance of the G-5. The CA staff will support Planning by identifying additional requirements for forces to support CMO. The CA staff will also take lead when coordinating with external civilian agencies, especially for the transition of civil responsibilities to civil authorities.

Communications

MAGTF Communications elements must be prepared to provide communications pathways between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations. Many will be civilian, and not have access to military communications. This connectivity will require attention even before operations, as the various agencies begin to coordinate their planning efforts.

Public Affairs (PA)¹⁰

Public Affairs and CMO are mutually supportive. Their synergy in the “Information Battle” is one of the key elements of the MAGTF approach to CMO. CMO is an element of the story of MAGTF operations that PA forces will carry to various audiences and across the force, and will often exemplify the strategic goals to which the operation is intended to contribute. At the same time, PA assets can broadcast and even amplify the effects of CMO efforts, enabling further CMO.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)

The SJA is the commander’s principle legal advisor. CMO will make substantial demands upon the SJA beyond his usual responsibilities, including the commander’s requirement for assistance with contract and international law issues. At the same time, the SJA’s facility with negotiation can be highly effective when attempting to form consensus between the MAGTF and external organizations and between the various groups and populations themselves. The International Law section of the CAG can support the SJA Subject Matter Experts in a variety of topics to include international contract law.

¹⁰ The role of CA and PA capabilities within IO is discussed in JP 3-13 *Information Operations*

Chaplain

Chaplains are of enormous value in CMO, along with their Religious Programs sailors and Marine Chaplain Assistants. The Chaplain's primary responsibility will be to continue to provide religious ministry support to the Marines and sailors of the MAGTF. Operations such as Peace Enforcement or Humanitarian Assistance are especially challenging for personnel who may be under exceptional stress, faced with great tragedy, and constrained with potentially complicated Rules of Engagement. Chaplains assist the commander to "strengthen the moral and spiritual well-being of personnel under his or her command" in order to "strengthen operational readiness and mission capability"¹¹. This support to the commander may be critical, as the actions of individual Marines under great stress may have strategic implications during CMO.

As a secondary role, chaplains may also provide important support directly to operations. First, their presence among units of the MAGTF demonstrates core US principles to civilians, enhancing the legitimacy of our efforts and gaining cooperation. Second, they may be able to establish channels of communications with civilian religious leaders, supplementing communication and coordination efforts of the commander and his staff. Finally, during certain operations, they may be available to minister directly to civilians, calming them and again gaining their cooperation.

Subordinate Units

As the mission requires, subordinate units execute CMO as planned and directed by the MAGTF commander. There will often be a need to provide dedicated CA support to these subordinate units. The MAGTF CA Officer will recommend appropriate employment of CA personnel in order to support the entire force as the situation dictates.

Marine Corps Planning Process

The MCPP is a flexible system that supports decisionmaking by the commander and helps to convey his decisions to all members of the force¹². Depending on the time and staff resources available, it may be quite detailed, or may be abbreviated. Its tenets are top-down planning, a single battle concept, and integrated planning. CMO must be rigorously considered throughout the MCPP, and not merely "tacked-on" as an afterthought. As specialists tasked to help the commander plan, coordinate, and execute CMO, as well as all MAGTF operations with a civil dimension, it is essential that CA personnel master the MCPP. As with the other members of the staff, CA Marines must exercise considerable judgment during the MCPP: they must ensure the commander considers critical civil-military concerns, while not over-burdening him with non-essential inputs. When dedicated CA personnel are not available, the commander may identify this as shortfall and request support from higher headquarters. In any case, the

¹¹ Information on the role of chaplains and the Religious Ministry Team is contained in MCWP 6-12 *Religious Ministry Support in the U. S. Marine Corps*.

¹² MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process* provides extensive information on the MCPP.

commander is still required to consider the civil-military implications of his mission and its accomplishment. The MCPP is organized into six steps:

- Mission Analysis

The Mission Analysis reviews and analyzes all available information, including orders and guidance from higher headquarters. **It drives the remainder of the MCPP, so it is essential that civil considerations be identified at this earliest stage.** Mission Analysis begins with the commander's orientation to his situation: critical inputs will include political, social, and cultural characteristics of the AO. Information from non-military sources, such as NGOs/IOs, OGAs, business and academia will be important. CA personnel support the commander's orientation by gathering information from non-military sources, by producing Area Studies, and by verifying information with Area Assessments. CA Marines will also be especially alert for civil considerations identified in guidance from higher headquarters, including restraints and constraints. CA staff will help the commander to identify friendly and enemy centers of gravity. For example, the identification of MAGTF cohesiveness with allies, coalition partners, and the citizens of the Host Nation as a center of gravity drives the staff to the development of operations that protect these sources of strength from enemy misinformation campaigns and our own negative actions. Depending on the mission, civil considerations may drive part of the end-state the commander is attempting to identify and then accomplish through his operations. The CA staff may begin to determine milestones that will help the commander evaluate his operation, adjusting it as necessary. CA Marines may also recommend Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), elements of information that the commander determines are essential to maintaining situational awareness (SA), making decisions, and developing plans.

During the Mission Analysis process, civil-military factors are considered as the commander and staffs identify specified, implied, and essential tasks as well as constraints and restraints. CA personnel are especially valuable during this identification of implied tasks; their special focus and experience aid them to plan for civil-military considerations while the remainder of the staff may be focused on threat forces. Similarly, the CA staff may recommend additional constraints and restraints that the commander will apply across the MAGTF. Constraints limit the force's freedom of action, and might include directions to avoid damaging key civilian infrastructure or limiting the type of weapons that may be used in a populated area. Restraints are things the force must do, such as be prepared to conduct Dislocated Civilian operations, or provide specified medical attention to civilians under particular conditions.

During Mission Analysis, the CA staff begins development of the CMO Estimate: a summary of all civil-military factors that may effect mission accomplishment. The CMO Estimate supports decisionmaking throughout the planning process and subsequent execution of the operations. It is maintained and continuously refined throughout the operation. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the CMO Estimate may be as informal as an oral briefing or as formal as a detailed written document.

The CA staff may identify resource shortfalls during mission analysis. This may include functional specialists or subject matter experts who will be required based on the situation. They may also include additional personnel to directly support the MAGTF or to serve as liaisons to other critical organizations, including the JFC's CA staff section, the JCMOTF, or lead civilian agencies.

The most important product of mission analysis will be the Mission Statement, accompanied by a refined statement of commander's intent and commander's planning guidance. At its most basic, the mission statement is the commander's answer to the fundamental question "What do I want to do?" In operations with a large civil-military component, the **mission statement from higher headquarters may allow the MAGTF commander considerable latitude** in defining the MAGTF mission statement. For example, the higher mission statement may be phrased as "Support the Government of..." or "Provide Humanitarian Assistance to...". CA staff work along with other staff sections to refine this guidance and produce a MAGTF mission statement which is achievable, and which notifies higher headquarters of the specific limits to MAGTF capabilities and intentions. **During combat operations, CMO may be an element of the MAGTF's Shaping Actions, which will set conditions for Decisive Action by enabling MAGTF freedom of action while limiting the enemy.** Once the Mission Statement is written, the MAGTF staff begins to develop Courses of Action that will solve the now clearly stated problem.

-Battle command is best described by terms such as *coup d'oeil* or *fingerspitzengefühl*; insight into the right action to take immediately and in the near future is based upon the commander's personal estimate of the situation.
- LTC James Zanol, Cdr, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR (NTC OPFOR)

- Course of Action (COA) Development

COA development generates options for operations that meet the requirements of the mission, the commander's intent, and the commander's planning guidance. In essence, COA development suggests answers to the commander's question "How do I want to do it?" These options will be compared and wargamed to ensure that they are suitable, feasible, and complete. After wargaming, the commander will eventually select one COA, potentially with modifications, for further planning and execution. During development the CA staff must simply identify COA that will require supporting CMO- it is not yet necessary to determine the specifics of how CMO will be accomplished. At this point the staff will also begin to consider the Task Organization that will be required to support each COA. During operations that are CMO intensive, such as HA or DSO, different COA might explore whether or not the MAGTF will directly accomplish specific functions, or instead may concentrate on facilitating the operations of other agencies.

Developed COA are briefed to the commander. This brief may include initial estimates of supportability from subordinate commanders and staff estimates, including those provided by the CA force. The CA staff estimate will briefly summarize the civil-military aspects of the situation that will influence each COA, and may note which COA are vulnerable to enemy CMO. The estimate will identify COA which will require CMO as a supporting effort, will comment on which of the proposed COA are supportable or not supportable with regards to the civil-military assets available, and will recommend one or more of the COA for further development.

"Which factors are critical...? Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale. They may be capabilities such as armored forces or aviation strength. They may be localities such as a critical piece of terrain that anchors an entire defensive system. They may be the relationship between two or more components of the system such as the cooperation between two arms, the relations in an alliance, or the junction of two forces. In short, centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are friendly centers of gravity, we want to protect them, and if they are enemy centers of gravity, we want to take them away."

-MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

- Course of Action War Game

COA wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each approved COA as it pertains to the enemy and the battlespace. **The CMO considerations of each COA are contained within this battlespace evaluation.** Dedicated CA staff can be especially valuable in considering the possible and likely actions of civilian populations, organizations, and enemy CMO efforts, as wargaming relies heavily on the operational experience and judgment of the commander and the staff. Just as the staff will evaluate each COA against enemy COA, **the CA staff must consider the likely civilian actions and reactions to MAGTF operations.**

During the course of wargaming, the staff (including CA staff) will record the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and identify possible branch plans and sequels for further planning. For example, wargaming particular COA may indicate a particular vulnerability to Dislocated Civilian traffic along key lines of communication. A branch plan will be required to resolve this source of friction. Wargaming might also indicate that certain MAGTF operations are vulnerable to enemy CMO, in that they might be portrayed in a negative light to an undecided civilian population. In this case, the **COA might require either modification, or supporting Civil Information or PSYOP efforts.** COA wargaming may also indicate requirements for additional communication, coordination, and even liaison with civilian organizations. The COA war game will often result in a refined CA staff estimate of supportability.

- COA Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COA and selects the one he believes will best accomplish the mission. He may also refine his mission statement (including his commanders intent and essential tasks) and identify any branches of the chosen COA for further staff attention. When available, the **MAGTF CA officer supports COA comparison both as a staff officer and as a subordinate commander**. As a staff officer, he provides his expertise to indicate which of the various COA is most likely to achieve success with regards to civil-military concerns. As a commander, the CA officer might provide such an estimate in terms of the CA personnel available to support the various COA.

- Orders Development

The orders development step in the MCPP enables the commander to communicate his decisions and intent across the MAGTF. Development includes detailed planning of the basic order as well as necessary annexes and appendixes. Throughout development, it is important to consider that the output will be a product transitioned to commanders and members of the force who may not have participated in the previous Planning Process steps. Therefore, the approved order or plan must contain enough information to **guide required actions, while enabling effective decisionmaking** as opportunities and threats present themselves during the course of the operation.

The CA staff is typically responsible for preparing Annex G “Civil Affairs”¹³ to the order, along with appropriate appendixes¹⁴. **However, it is not sufficient for the MAGTF CA staff to focus solely on Annex G** as their participation in the orders development process. Like all other staff elements, CA personnel assist with the orders reconciliation process, ensuring that the basic order and all the annexes and appendixes are both complete and are in agreement. When gaps or discrepancies are found, they must be resolved or “deconflicted”. The CA staff ensures that CMO concerns are addressed throughout the order in such a way that **subordinate elements will be properly prepared** for whatever situations present themselves during the course of the operation. The orders development process may also include the preparation of Branch Plans, guiding action to be taken in the event of likely incidents during operations. Once the order is developed, it must be transitioned to the force

- Transition

The transition process provides a shift from planning to execution. It must enhance the **situational awareness** of those who will execute the order, **maintain the intent** of the commander’s concept of operations, and **promote unity of effort**. The transition process may include Transition Briefs, Transition Drills, and or Confirmation Briefs. CA Marines may participate in any or all of these efforts.

¹³ The title and format for Annex G is prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03A, dated 31 December 1999. The title of the Annex is misleading, as the information it contains may cover all CMO, in addition to the more specialized CA activities or operations.

¹⁴ The equivalent input to a NATO order is generally Annex W, entitled “CIMIC”

ensuring that those who will execute the order know and understand the actions they must accomplish.

The MAGTF CA officer has a **dual responsibility** during Transition, serving as **both a member of the staff and as a commander**. In the first case, he must ensure that all elements of the force are prepared to execute the order. In the second, he must ensure that his subordinate CA elements are specifically prepared and equipped for any tasks they are required to execute. If any or all of these subordinate CA commanders did not participate in the Planning Process, they may lack shared situational awareness with the MAGTF CA officer, and will require specific preparation for their roles in the operation. When subordinate CA elements are placed in support of subordinate MAGTF elements, they will be considered the “Duty Experts” for CMO, and will require additional information beyond that contained in the order itself. **Whenever subordinate CA elements are to be employed, the MAGTF staff officer must work to succeed as a commander, along with his responsibilities as a staff officer.**

Marine Corps Planning Process CMO Integration		
<u>Step</u>	<u>CMO Concern</u>	<u>Continuing Actions</u>
Mission Analysis:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation • Identify Centers of Gravity • Identify Constraints/Restrains • Recommend CMO CCIR • Identify MAGTF and CMO Tasks • Initiate CMO Staff Estimate • Identify Resource Shortfalls • Draft Mission Statement • Present Mission Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update WRT political, cultural, social considerations. Identify and evaluate external civilian organizations • Analyze/determine Critical Vulnerabilities • Transition across MAGTF • Identify and forward RFI's • Update/Refine - Deliver as Req'd • Forward • Update/Refine
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COA Development:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop one or more COA • Brief COA • Select COA for Wargaming • Develop Commander's Evaluation Criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness • Consider Task Organization req'd to support • Consider Enemy COA • Initial Estimate of Supportability • Initial CMO Staff Estimate • Impacts of civilians on each COA • Impacts of each COA on civilians • Political/Informational Considerations
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COA War Game	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • War Game each COA • Refine CMO Staff Estimate • Refine CMO Estimate of Supportability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider “What If?” • Record advantages/disadvantages of each COA • Identify additional Tasks • Identify possible Branches and Sequels for planning • Identify tasking for CA elements: e.g. supported units, liaison req’s • Identify MAGTF elements requiring CA support
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COA Comparison/ Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommend COA from CMO perspective • Identify Commander’s changes to COA • Support prep of Concept of Ops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Warning order to CA elements • Identify Branches/Sequels req further development
Orders Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop Annex G “Civil Affairs” • Reconcile all portions of order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop Supporting Plans e.g. DC Ops, CMOC Ops, Claims • Develop outline FRAGOs for Branches • Compare with Higher, Adjacent Orders • Identify, correct gaps and deficiencies
Transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transition from Planners to Executors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •

Concept of Operations for CMO

The following is a generic campaign plan for CMO support to MAGTF operations. It provides a basis for expansion and adjustment, and may vary widely depending on the specifics of the operation and the assignment of other joint forces to the operation. Not every step will apply to every operation. The Marine Corps Planning Process will support the C2 efforts necessary to accomplish each step in the CMO Campaign Plan.

Stage 1: Pre-Operation.

1. Begin Information Preparation of the AO.
 - Identify and request information required/desired for planning.
 - Explore systems that failed and led to the present operation.
 - Explore systems which succeeded previously and which might be regenerated efficiently.
 - Insert a forward liaison and analysis element in order to close information requirements.

2. Prepare the force.
 - Educate Marines in the civil-military context of the operation
 - Prepare leaders and individual Marines to make effective decisions
 - Prepare Marines to support Information Operations
3. Establish coordination and communication channels with external civilian organizations.

Stage 2: Arrival in the AO.

1. Perform CMO to support MAGTF deployment.
2. Validate, update, and disseminate CMO Estimate of the Situation.
 - Perform Area Assessments to validate Area Studies.
3. Recommend adjustments to the Force List for forces to support CMO, including CA forces.
4. When appropriate to the mission, perform CMO “Triage”,
 - Accomplish what is immediately possible, enhancing MAGTF legitimacy and therefore Force Protection.
 - Enhance the legitimacy of the Host Nation government.
5. Define specific desired end states and refine plans.
6. Confirm communication and coordination channels
 - a. Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting CMO and CA elements.
 - b. Civilian agencies in the AO.
 - c. Reachback elements

Stage 3: Sustainable Operations.

1. Perform CMO to support the MAGTF.
2. Repair/create social, cultural, or physical (when authorized) infrastructure that will support long term success.
 - Conduct DC Ops: move DC’s to locations from which they can be supported by other agencies.
 - Develop civilian capabilities that can assume responsibility for civil concerns after MAGTF redeployment.
 - Do not simply recreate systems that previously existed: they failed and led to the MAGTF’s introduction.
3. Complete planning for transition of responsibilities to external agencies.
4. Enhance the legitimacy of governments and agencies that will provide support after the MAGTF redeploys.
5. Facilitate the repatriation of former combatants.
6. Process claims against the MAGTF.

Stage 4: Redeployment.

1. Perform CMO to support MAGTF redeployment.
 2. Transition civil responsibilities to civilian organizations by functional area.
-

Interagency Coordination**The Interagency Process and Participants**

MAGTF operations, both at home and overseas, are increasingly likely to be conducted in an interagency environment. Other government agencies (OGAs), International Organizations (IOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) will often be involved in an emergency situation even before the commitment of the MAGTF. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as the power contributed by partners such as nongovernmental agencies. Effective communication and cooperation will enable access to substantial capabilities and resources not typically under MAGTF control. Synchronization of efforts leads to synergy, in which the application of each capability adds to the effectiveness of others. Failure to properly coordinate may complicate MAGTF efforts, as different organizations try to achieve incompatible objectives by using irreconcilable means. The MAGTF will generally operate alongside three different types of civilian agencies: other government agencies (OGAs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and International Organizations (IOs).

- **Other Government Agencies**

Military forces represent only one instrument of national power. Other organizations in the US government are structured and equipped to apply other functions to operations, including diplomatic, economic, informational, and civil policing. Agencies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) each have roles in both foreign and domestic operations and can add to the power that a MAGTF applies to a situation. Careful communication and coordination will be required to ensure that the actions of the MAGTF and these agencies are mutually supporting.

- **Nongovernmental Organizations and International Organizations (NGOs and IOs)**

Whether conflict is building or ongoing, NGOs and IOs are likely to be working wherever the MAGTF operates. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs/IOs are frequently on the scene before US forces, are often willing to operate in high-risk areas, and will likely remain long after military forces have departed. Generally speaking, these organizations are guided by three principles as they respond to a

humanitarian crisis: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. NGOs/IOs are flexible, grassroots-focused, and are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. They often refer to their efforts in a crisis as a “response”, much as we refer to an “operation”.

These relief agencies may have substantial resources: the US NGO “CARE” has applied more than \$350 million a year to programs recently. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can limit the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Their extensive and long-term involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations also make these organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments as well as civilian attitudes toward the operation. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide make them key nodes for communication and coordination: they must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs are voluntary organizations. They are legally different from USG and international agencies in that they write their own charter and missions. They are funded by private donors, international organizations, and governments. While not answerable to profit-making institutions, they are accountable to their various donors for the resources they require. NGOs vary from established concerns with substantial staffs and budgets, to charities operated by local community organizations. The relationship between military forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

Inherent differences between the cultures and organization of military forces and NGOs present challenges to successful cooperation. First, in order to protect their freedom to operate, NGOs are likely to be hesitant to identify too closely with the MAGTF. Collaboration or perceived collaboration with military forces may endanger both the missions of NGOs and the lives of their field staff, especially when a particular response or operation has political or military implications. Second, NGOs often operate without detailed planning. This is a byproduct of their small staffs, limited ability to assess the situation prior to arrival on location, and inability to prejudge the degree to which donors will provide resources for NGOs to use as the response continues. As a consequence, however, NGOs can also reorient their efforts and assets with great agility. Finally, the MAGTF is often predisposed not to share information, especially about future plans or operations. Cooperation that identifies agreed upon objectives and a clear understanding of what information can and cannot be shared will be of great benefit to all parties.

International Organizations

International Organizations are established by intergovernmental agreements. They operate at the international level and are chartered by organizations such as the United

Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO). IOs likely to be operating in the field during a crisis include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food Program (WFP). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also an IO, as its role is defined by a number of international treaties. While IOs conduct operations in the field very much like NGOs, they may work in a command and control structure that details their support to a designated civilian agency¹⁵.

At the strategic level, there are a number of coordinating mechanisms that attempt to achieve agreement between agencies at the policy level.¹⁶ In the field, commanders and staffs must devote personal effort and develop effective mechanisms to achieve unity of purpose by developing consensus among the organizations involved. Structurally, the MAGTF will generally find itself participating in interagency operations according to one of the following models:

Interagency Coordination for Domestic Operations

Military operations inside the US and its territories are limited by law and regulation, but may be appropriate when situations require resources that civil capabilities cannot meet. Guidance and direction for the command and control of these operations varies depending on the mission and the support to be provided but is generally similar. The Federal Response Plan (FRP)¹⁷ outlines how federal agencies, including the DoD, assist local and state agencies that request assistance when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Additional DoD Directives, Memoranda of Understanding, and agreements provide details for military response for particular missions.¹⁸

Depending on the type of emergency, a civil command and control focal point for federal response will be established. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibility for coordinating Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. Acting for the President, FEMA will appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who is responsible for coordinating federal disaster assistance to States and territories. Plans for other emergencies designate a

¹⁵ The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) acts as the UN's interagency coordination and information exchange body among UN humanitarian agencies. It is a valuable node for communication and coordination between NGOs and IOs. Deployed US forces have successfully used the OCHA web site, www.reliefweb.int to facilitate interagency coordination efforts in response to several complex emergencies, and numerous conferences and after-action reports have recommended even greater usage.

¹⁶ *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) –56* establishes U.S policy for interagency operations overseas and directs the use of several coordinating mechanisms and planning tools to achieve the integration of civil, military, police, and aid functions. While PDD-56 applies formally only to "Complex Contingency Operations"- those short of war- it provides a useful model for adaptation to a variety of interagency operations.

¹⁷ The *Federal Response Plan* is a document signed by 27 Federal departments and agencies, including DoD. It details how Federal assistance is coordinated and delivered in support of State and local governments for disaster or emergency. It serves as a model and supplements other Federal emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards

¹⁸ Other instructions include DoD Directives 2000.12 *DoD Combating Terrorism Program*, 3025.1 *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, 3025.12 *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances*, 3025.15 *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, and 4000.19 *Interservice and Intragovernment Support*

distinct Lead Federal Agency (LFA). For example, the Attorney General is responsible for the management of the Federal response to civil disturbance. In any case, the federal manager may request military resources from the DoD.

The Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for military support involving civil disturbance, acts of terrorism, or other actions with the potential for confrontation with specifically identified individuals and/or groups or will result in the use of lethal force, as well as support which would require the use of forces assigned to the Combatant Commands. In most situations, however, he will designate the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent to implement and oversee domestic military support. The Director of Military Support (DOMS), established under the Secretary of the Army, plays a key role in the process of responding to requests for military support and providing forces. DOMS will also appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), a military official specifically designated to orchestrate DoD support on-scene. Upon assignment, military forces will typically be formed into a JTF or Response Task Force (RTF), often based on a numbered US Army or MEF. This Task Force is then placed in support of the FCO or LFA.¹⁹

Interagency Coordination for Foreign Operations

Operations in foreign areas arise as a result of the United States' national interests and our external relationships. For the MAGTF, these operations may stretch from MTW and Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs) to engagement and other Operations Other Than War, including humanitarian assistance (HA) and peace operations. Because they address US national interests, they are likely to involve more than just military instruments of power. Like domestic operations then, foreign operations will often be interagency operations.

Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementing regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. His civil counterpart in a particular country is the US ambassador, who usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in a host country. His authority does not extend to military forces assigned to the combatant commander. He chairs the Country Team, which includes the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other USG agencies operating within a country. Close coordination between the combatant commander and the ambassador and country team is essential and must complement the coordination achieved at the policy level between the various agencies themselves.

Depending upon the situation, the combatant commander and his assigned forces may also have interagency relationships at the operational level that may be similar to the hierarchies established for domestic operations. When the United Nations, NATO, or other international organizational mandates a particular operation, a senior civilian coordinator is often appointed, such as a UN Special Representative. The international community may also designate a lead agency such as the UNHCR or WFP to coordinate the activities of civilian organizations. This lead agency and its partners may operate

¹⁹ JP 3-07.7 *JTTP for Domestic Support Operations* provides tactics, techniques, and procedures.

under legal agreements with host nation governments. In any case, US military forces will need to establish methods of communicating and coordinating with these international structures while also conducting coordination among US agencies at the national level.²⁰

“The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality.”

-Joint Vision 2020

Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level

Interagency Relationships.

To be successful, the interagency process should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. While military organizations may simply direct the actions of subordinate military elements towards the establishment of a declared objective, interagency partners are unlikely to be under the command of the MAGTF, and may not even agree upon the desired goal. In the interagency environment, therefore, communication and coordination replaces command and control. As a minimum, the interagency process should establish and agree to broad objectives and policies which will guide the actions of each of the agencies involved. The organizations must also develop mechanisms to share a “common operational picture”: a mutual appreciation of planned and current operations can deconflict problems before they begin, and may lead to opportunities for mutual support.

Steps for MAGTF commanders that identify mutual objectives and support effective interagency coordination include:

1. Identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation,
2. Identify the resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort;
3. Determine mutually supportable objectives for the operation,
4. Define the desired end state and exit criteria,
5. Define the types of information which can and cannot be exchanged, establish agreed upon formats for data, and develop means to share information useful to multiple partners,
6. Begin planning for the transition of responsibilities to agencies with long-term duties and interests,
7. Establish an interagency hierarchy when possible,
8. Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays,
9. Define courses of action for both military operations and agency activities,

²⁰ AJP-9, *NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine* provides guidance for interagency operations when operating within NATO

10. Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities,
11. Maximize the mission's assets to support the longer term goals of the enterprise,
12. Establish interagency assessment teams.

MAGTF as Part of Interagency Operations. Any MAGTF effort across the spectrum of operations is likely to be an interagency operation in support of the US national interest. The identification of specific lead agencies, and the degree to which interagency concerns may vary with the intensity of the emergency or conflict, but will always apply to some degree. The establishment of a relationship between military and civil authorities that is based on mutual trust and confidence may be the difference between success and failure of the operation. In the words of General A.C. Zinni, USMC, "Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center." Communication and coordination complements command and control in the interagency process.

Appendix A. References

- a. DOD Directive 2000.13 “Civil Affairs”
- b. DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities.”
- c. DOD Directive 3025.14, “Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad”
- d. DOD Directive 3025.15 “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities”
- e. DOD Directive 5100.46, “Foreign Disaster Relief.”
- f. DOD Directive 5525.1, “Status of Forces Policies and Information.”
- g. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War.”
- h. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations.”
- i. Joint Pub 3-07.6 “Joint Tactics Yechniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance”
- j. Joint Pub 3-07.7 “Domestic Support Operations”
- k. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
- l. Joint Pub 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.”
- m. Joint Pub 3-57.1 “Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs”
- n. MCWP 6-2 “Command and Control”
- o. FM 27-10, “Law of Land Warfare.”
- p. FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”
- q. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations.”
- r. FM 100-23, “Peace Support Operations.”
- s. DA Pamphlet 27-153, “Procurement Law.”
- t. NWP 9/FMFM 1-10, 1989, “The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.”
- u. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “Handbook for Emergencies.

Appendix B. CMO Estimate

Coordinating Draft Note: A joint format for CMO Estimates is being developed in conjunction with the US Army Special Operations Command at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. This format will be included in JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*; and FM 41-10-1, *Tactics Techniques and Procedures for CA*. It will be included in the final version of MCWP 3-33.1, *MAGTF CMO*, and appended to MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

Appendix C. Civil-Military Operations Status Report Format

The CIVMILSTAT message is a joint, preformatted format. It is appropriate for use by any echelon of command, and may be required by Joint Force Commanders. When used within elements of the MAGTF, it may be abbreviated as appropriate to the situation and mission.

TITLE: CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STATUS [CIVMILSTAT]
REPORT NUMBER: C015 {USMTF # B991}

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to provide a status of the civil affairs and civilian-military cooperation and relations situation. Reference: FM 41-10.

LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME _____ (DTG)

LINE 2 – UNIT _____ (Unit Making Report)

LINE 3 LIAISON _____ (Establishment of and Changes in Liaison Arrangements Between Civil and Military)

LINE 4 – CONTROL _____ (Establishment and Changes in Location, Status, Activity of Control Nodes and in the CMO AO)

LINE 5 – AREA OF OPERATIONS _____ (CMO AO Name)

LINE 6 – US CIVILIANS _____ (Total Number of US Civilians in AO)

LINE 7 – THIRD COUNTRY _____ (Total Number of Third Country Civilians in AO)

LINE 8 – FOREIGN NATION _____ (Total Number of Foreign Nation Civilians in AO)

LINE 9 – TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION _____ (Total Civilian Population in the AO)

LINE 10 – MALES UNDER 16 _____ (Total Number of Dislocated Males Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 11 – UNACCOMPANIED MALES UNDER 16 _____ (Total Number of Dislocated Unaccompanied Males Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 12 – MALES OVER 60 _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Males Over 60 Years of Age)

LINE 13 – MARRIED MALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Married Males)

LINE 14 – SINGLE MALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Single Males)

LINE 15 – FEMALES UNDER 16 _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Females Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 16 – UNACCOMPANIED FEMALES UNDER 16 _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Unaccompanied Females Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 17 – FEMALES OVER 60 _____ (Total Number of Females Over
60 Years of Age)

LINE 18 – MARRIED FEMALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Married Females)

LINE 19 – SINGLE FEMALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Single Females)

LINE 20 – DISLOCATED MALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Males in AO)

LINE 21 – DISLOCATED FEMALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Females in AO)

LINE 22 – TOTAL MALES AND FEMALES _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Males And Females in AO)

LINE 23 – CONTROLLED _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Civilians in Controlled Movement)

LINE 24 – UNCONTROLLED _____ (Total Number of Dislocated
Civilians in Uncontrolled Movement)

LINE 25 – MANPOWER _____ (Changes in Civilian Manpower
Indicate Changes/Shortages in Labor Availability)

LINE 26 – PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION _____ (Changes in Capability to
Continue Essential Functions)

LINE 27 – LEGAL _____ (Changes in Status of Legal
Accommodations and Accords)

LINE 28 – INTELLIGENCE _____ (Changes in Civilian Attitude;
Identification of Collaborators, Agents, and Dissident Elements; Espionage, Sabotage, and Political
Subversion)

LINE 29 – LAW AND ORDER _____ (Changes in Civilian Law and
Order)

LINE 30 – PUBLIC HEALTH _____ (Changes in Status of Public
Health)

LINE 31 – SUPPLY _____ (Changes in Status of Civilian
Supplies)

LINE 32 – TRANSPORTATION _____ (Changes in Status of the Civil
Transportation System)

LINE 33 – DRINKING WATER _____ (Water Potability Status; Potable,
Local Only; Nonpotable; to US Standards, as Applicable)

LINE 34 – WATER PRODUCTION _____ (Adequacy of the Water
Production Capability; Adequate, Not Adequate, or None, as Applicable)

LINE 35 – SEWAGE TREATMENT _____ (Status of Sewage Treatment;
Adequate, Not Adequate, or None, as Applicable)

LINE 36 – REFUSE _____ (Status of Refuse Collection
Adequate, Not Adequate, or None as Applicable)

LINE 37 – RADIO _____ (Status of the Radio Capability
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 38 – TELEVISION _____ (Status of the Television
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 39 – NEWSPAPER _____ (Status of the Newspaper
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 40 – POSTAL _____ (Status of the Postal Capability
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 41 – TELEPHONE _____ (Status of the Telephone
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 42 – TELEGRAPH _____ (Status of the Telegraph
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 43 – TELETYPE _____ (Status of the Teletype Capability
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 44 – ELECTRIC NAVIGATION SYSTEM _____ (Status of the Electric Navigation
System Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 45 – WORD OF MOUTH _____ (Status of Word of Mouth
Communications Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 46 – CIVIL DEFENSE _____ (Civil Defense Incidents Affecting
Civilian Community, Critical Events, and Assistance Provided US Forces)

LINE 47 – SHORTAGES _____ (Changes or Shortages
Community (Water Shortages, Quarantines, Road Restrictions, Curfews))

LINE 48 – SUPPORT RECEIVED _____ (Changes in Support Received
From Civilian Community)

LINE 49 – PSYOP _____ (Changes in Enemy PSYOP
Actions Targeted at Civilian Community)

LINE 50 – PROTECTED PROPERTY _____ (Changes in Status of Arts,
Monuments, and Archives)

LINE 51 – CULTURE _____ (Changes in Local Civil, Social,
Cultural, Religious, and Ethnic Characteristics)

LINE 52 – RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (Narrative Summary and
Recommendations concerning the Status of Civil-Military Operations Activities)

LINE 53 – NARRATIVE _____ (Free Text for information
Required Clarification of Report)

APPENDIX D. Sample Annex G *CIVIL AFFAIRS*

This Appendix contains a sample ANNEX G, *Civil Affairs* for MAGTF operations. It is generic, and should be adjusted for the particular operations and type of MAGTF supported. It is written IAW format identified in MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process* and may be abbreviated or expanded as time and situation permit. Careful attention must be paid to the classification of this Annex and individual paragraphs in order to share this document or appropriate portions with other agencies. Italicized text is suggested for inclusion. Appendixes to Annex G are not mandated by Joint or Marine Corps doctrine, but are used as necessary. The enclosed Appendices are suggested as useful. Updates to the Annex G format and content can be found via the Internet.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
Message reference number

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)
(Operation CODEWORD) ()

CIVIL AFFAIRS ()

() REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.

- (a) [Map]
- (b) [Operations Order]
- (c) [Applicable Op/Con Plan]

1. () Situation

a. () General. Refer to Basic Plan and other annexes, as appropriate. Summarize the situation as it applies to civilian populace in the battlespace and the intentions and capabilities of the government, if any. Do not repeat information contained in the general situation paragraph of the basic operation order or plan or detailed information in the appendices. Emphasize areas affecting displaced persons, government stability and destruction or degradation of civilian infrastructure. Consider the support of the government by the populace, and the probable reaction of the populace towards US intervention. Consider the civil impact of MAGTF operations in the battlespace and elsewhere in the region.

(1) () Establish the legal basis for, and expected scope of, CMO in this operation and include identification of pertinent international and civil-military agreements. *“The MAGTF will meet our legal and moral obligations to the civilian populace in our area of influence. Operations will be planned to cause the minimum suffering for non-combatants and include the maximum humanitarian assistance. It is US policy that operations must meet, and if possible exceed the Rules of Engagement (ROE), laws of warfare, and the Geneva Conventions. “*

(2) () State the purpose of this annex, which normally is to provide instructions for guiding all relationships between the military force and civil organizations, authorities and inhabitants in the operational area. *“This annex with supporting appendices identifies CMO for all phases of the operation, and guides all relationships between the MAGTF and civil authorities, inhabitants, IO's and NGO's, and Third Country Nationals (TCN's). When the MAGTF is employed as an enabling force for larger, follow-on forces, CMO may be directed towards obtaining and reporting an accurate assessment of the current civil-military situation, and creating an information infra-structure to support future CMO.”*

b. () Enemy. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence. Assess the impact of enemy capabilities and probable COA on the civil-military situation, with particular emphasis on identifying requirements for CMO, civil affairs functions and activities. Consider the potential for enemy disruption of MAGTF CMO and the potential for presentation of MAGTF operations to the local and world populace in a negative light. Summarize the expected civil-military situation, including government institutions, customs and attitudes of the population, and availability of indigenous resources. Consider the effects of climate and terrain on CMO. Consider prevailing sociological conditions, including ethnic, religious, language, or cultural tendencies that may present obstacles to effective MAGTF operations and CMO.

c. () Friendly. State the CA functions to be performed by civilian authorities of the US and allied governments in the AO. Identify local indigenous assets available to support and assist in CMO. Identify elements providing staff augmentation and expertise to the MAGTF. State location and capability of Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)/ Civil Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC) if established.

(1) () Identify Unified Commander's structure which guides CMO, whether J-5, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) or other organization. Restate policy and direction for the conduct of CMO within the AO.

(2) () Identify senior Operational Commander's structure that guides CMO. This might include Commander Naval Forces when he is the supported commander. Restate mission for the conduct of CMO.

(3) () Consider OGA plans and activities in the battlespace. Consider Department of State (DOS)/ American Embassy (AMEMB) guidance and activities.

DOS/AMEMB provides general information on US and other TCN's in the AO, and provides information on the requirements of international law, agreements, principles, or policies that apply to the MAGTF. This may include SOFA, staging and basing rights, logistical support, purchasing rights, etc. Identify Non- DOS US agencies and personnel with experience in the AO. This may include agencies operating from within the AMEMB, such as FBI, DOJ, NCIS, and USDA.

d. () Assumptions. List the basic assumptions upon which CMO planning is based, with particular attention to enemy COAs, availability of indigenous resources, and conclusion of necessary agreements with foreign governments on US forces. Consider making appropriate assumptions concerning US policy, international and civil-military agreements, enemy COAs, and availability of host-nation resources. Consider making appropriate assumptions about NGO COAs. Consider the need and opportunity to plan and/or to execute CMO during each planned phase of the operation.

2. () Mission. State the mission to be accomplished by CMO in support of the operations envisaged in the Basic Plan. *"On order, conduct CMO in order to support MAGTF operations as identified in the Basic Plan. Enhance MAGTF freedom of action. Prevent civilian interference with the MAGTF's military mission. Identify and coordinate civilian resources that support our operations. Deny a supportive operational environment to the enemy, especially to asymmetric threats. Be prepared to support Mass Casualty operations and consequence management. Desired endstate typically includes a stable and secure environment permitting redeployment of the MAGTF from the AO and /or a return to amphibious shipping."*

3. () Execution. CMO ranges from civil-military liaison in the AO to support for a Unified Commander's assumption of military government or civil administration. The functions may vary within the AO or between phases of the operation. Therefore, this paragraph may require considerable detail and possibly alternative plans. Use appendixes as necessary to provide long or detailed guidance.

a. () Concept of the Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of CMO from beginning to end of the operation. Describe how CMO will support the MAGTF's operational mission.

1. () Time-phasing of the operation.

2. () The MAGTF is not capable of the execution of civil administration with organic assets. The concept of CMO should include the principle types of CMO to be performed. Consider describing concept for Populace and Resources Control, Foreign Nation Support, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Civic Action, and Domestic Support Operations.

3. () Deployment and employment of assets and elements in support of CMO.

4. () Scope and duration, to include post-conflict operations. Consider describing in terms of Pre-Operation, Immediate, Sustained, and Redeployment efforts.

5. () Clear and concise end states for CMO to describe the successful completion of each phase and COA.

6. () Function and operation of CMOC's/ CIMIC's if established.

b. () Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the MAGTF in separate numbered subparagraphs. Tasks should reflect the Task Organization in the Basic Plan. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed.

- d. () GCE: *Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Provide security to designated CMO. Be prepared to establish a "911" system for emergency support of designated external agencies and organizations. Be prepared to provide representation to the CMOC when established.*
- e. () ACE: *Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Provide representation to the CMOC when established. Be prepared to support MAGTF CMO when directed. Be prepared to support GCE "911" response operations.*
- f. () CSSE: *Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Be prepared to support the establishment of the CMOC/CIMIC. Be prepared to provide representation and planning support to the CMOC/CIMIC. Be prepared to conduct Mass Casualty operations. Be prepared to provide Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Be prepared to establish DC camps. Be prepared to support validated requests by the HN, NGOs, and allies for logistics support.*
- g. () Civil Affairs Element: *Consider describing in terms of CA Functional Specialties to be performed; Dislocated Civilians, Cultural Relations, Public Safety, Civilian Supply, Civil Information, Legal, Public Health, Public Works and Utilities, Public Communications.*
- h. () PSYOP Element:
- i. () Military Police Element:
- j. () Staff Judge Advocate:
- k. () Public Affairs Officer:
- l. () Contracting Officer:
- m. () Environmental Health/USAMRID Element:
- n. () MAGTF Surgeon:
- o. () Counter-Intelligence:"

c. () Coordinating instructions. List the instructions common to two or more elements of 22D MEU. Areas or events requiring coordination include but are not limited to:

- 1. () Establishment of CMO boundaries.
- 2. () Liaison arrangements with allied forces and between subordinate commands.

3. () Claims policies, in consonance with Appendix 4 to Annex E.
 4. () Liaison and coordination with US Government agencies. This includes coordination of information operations in order to present a consistent message in and out of the AO.
 5. () Liaison and coordination with Host Country, or other friendly countries, governments, and NGO's.
 6. () PSYOP support to CMO.
 7. () *"CMO will be planned centrally and executed locally.*
 8. () *Use non-MAGTF resources to support CMO whenever possible.*
 9. () *Direction on providing medical support to external agencies and individuals.*
 10. () *Units will avoid establishing positions in the vicinity of civilian locations. Under no circumstances allow hostile forces to create an incident which requires you to fire into civilian locations. When the situation demands it, include civilian locations within your defensive scheme of maneuver.*
 11. () *Commanders will attempt to coordinate with civilian authorities within their zones, and make every effort to be responsive to their needs.*
 12. () *Every effort will be made to interact with civilians through their own authorities.*
 13. () *DP routes and camps will be planned to avoid MAGTF high value targets.*
 14. () *Establish measures to protect religious, culturally significant, and other specified properties (See Appendix 2).*
 15. () *Barrier plans must be approved by CO MAGTF, and will be coordinated with HN government.*
 16. () *When CA assets are assigned below the CE, the supported element provides support, to include communications and logistics requirements."*
- d. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements Identify information on friendly, enemy, and civilian activities in the battlespace that the commander deems as critical for the conduct of CMO. Include information that helps maintain situational awareness, plan future activities, and assist in timely and accurate decisionmaking.
1. () *" Report any US or enemy violation of international law by Flash precedence traffic.*
 2. () *Report any groups of 50 or more DCs as a SpotRep.*
4. () Administration and Logistics
- a. () Military Resource Requirements . State any applicable requirements to maintain military equipment and supplies for support of CMO. (Refer to Annex D, Logistics.)

- b. () Civilian Personnel. Estimate the local civilian labor required and available to support military operations. (Refer to Annex E, Personnel.) This may often relate to APOD and RSOI operations.
 - c. () Civilian Facilities and Supplies. Estimate the local civilian facilities and supplies required and available to support the operation. (Refer to Annex D, Logistics.)
 - d. () Reports. Establish any necessary administrative reporting requirements.
 - 1. () *“Report location of CMOC and provide daily CMOC report when established below the CE level.*
 - 2. () *Locate, record, and report names of potential translators.”*
5. () Command and Control. Indicate the difference, if any, between the command channels for the conduct of CMO and the command relationships established in Annex J. Specify command responsibility for OPCON, ADCON, and logistics of CMO efforts and forces (emphasize difference between efforts and forces). Include any changes or transitions between command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements (CAA) and MOUs used and those requiring development.
- a. () *“CMO is a command responsibility at all levels.*
 - b. () *The G/S-3 (Operations) Officer (or MAGTF CA Officer) has staff cognizance over all CA activities and planning.*
 - c. () *The CA Officer is generally located with the Landing Force Operations Center.*
 - d. () *When assigned an operational role, Civil Affairs personnel are generally established in a location that facilitates interface with civilian authorities and has reliable communications with the supported commander. This is usually in the vicinity of the Main CP. CA personnel may also be assigned to the Forward Command Element (FCE) if inserted. They may be assigned to support subordinate elements when appropriate.*
 - e. () *Location of a CMOC is TBD, generally in the vicinity of the supported commander’s Operations Center”*

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Appendixes:

APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS)

APPENDIX 2 (PROTECTED TARGET GUIDANCE)

APPENDIX 3 (SOP FOR CMOC OPERATIONS)

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSITION MATRIX)

APPENDIX 5 (FCE OPERATIONS) TBI

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

(Operation CODEWORD) ()

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ()

1. () Availability of US personnel experienced in AO
 - a. () US Law Enforcement/Government- FBI, NCIS, ICPTF, DEA, USAID, OFDA
 - b. () US Business leaders
2. () Civil Authority
 - i. () Perceived Legitimacy of National and Local Police forces by civilian populace.
 1. () By Urban Populace
 2. () By Rural Populace
 - b. () Location of Civil Authority HQ's. Names and method of contact of commanders.
 1. () Local Government
 2. () Police forces
 3. () Fire services
 4. () Hospitals/Medical Services
 5. () Public Works and Sanitation
 6. () Emergency Management Operations Centers
 - c. () Availability of Identity Rosters, photo's. Description or samples of Identification Cards.
 - d. () Attitude of Local Authorities towards US intervention
 - e. () Location of government facilities in AO

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- f. () NGO's/IOs Operating in AO
 - 1. () In-country HQ locations, POC's, methods of contact
 - 2. () Worldwide HQ's, POC's, methods of contact.
 - 3. () Missions, capabilities, experience of organizations operating in AO.

- g. () Hospitals
 - 1. () Names, Locations, Capacity
 - 2. () Specialties, Adequacy, Condition

- h. () Water Supply
 - 1. () Type and location of source
 - 2. () Delivery methods
 - 3. () Treatment plants
 - 4. () Storage facilities
 - 5. () Average consumption by industry, agriculture
 - 6. () Total System, Capacity.

- i. () Food Distribution Centers
 - 1. () Location
 - 2. () Projected stocks
 - 3. () Managers/NGO Operators

- j. () Engineer/Construction Facilities and Equipment
 - 1. () Location and type
 - 2. () Stocks of construction equipment and materials

- k. () Sociological and Cultural Makeup of the populace
 - 1. () Languages/dialects
 - a. () Spoken
 - b. () Written
 - c. () Literacy rate
 - 2. () Customs
 - 3. () Typical diet, prevalent medical concerns

4. () Basic physical condition.
- k. () History of past foreign/US military involvement on AO.
- l. () Existing Treaties, Status of Forces Agreement with US

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PROTECTED TARGET GUIDANCE ()

1. () General.

- a. () This appendix provides guidance for commanders and Fire Support planners to assist in the development of the MAGTF "Protected Targets" list. Protected Targets are those locations that the Law of War deems exempt from fires of combatant forces because of cultural, religious, or population support functions. 22D MEU planners will consider the cultural, economic, political, and informational aspects of all operations.
- b. () Deliberate targeting avoids the following types of facilities due to their cultural, economic, and social significance:
 1. () Religious facilities.
 2. () Cultural and historic institutions, to include museums, art galleries, and commemorative parks.
 3. () Non-military schools.
 4. () Hospitals, clinics, and medical treatment and supply facilities.
- c. () MAGTF planners will consider establishing the following as protected targets, due to their population support functions and the potential impact of the their destruction on post-hostility reconstruction:
 1. () Water supply facilities.
 2. () Electric power generation and control facilities.
 3. () Waste water treatment facilities.
- d. () MAGTF planners will consider establishing archival and record keeping facilities such as libraries as protected targets, due to their unique value in reestablishing post-hostility public order and economic stability.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

(Operation CODEWORD) ()

CMOC OPERATIONS ()

() REFERENCES:

a. () Relevant Op Order

b. () Maps and overlays

1. () Situation. Virtually any AO the MAGTF operates in will be occupied by civilian inhabitants. It is likely that the AO will be experiencing one or more types of emergencies, and governmental, International, And Non-Governmental Organizations (IO/NGOs) will be present and at work. Without proper coordination, these organizations can interfere, often accidentally with MAGTF operations.

2. () Mission. On order the MAGTF establishes a Civil-Military Operations Center ashore in order to facilitate communication, coordination between the MAGTF and external civilian organizations and populations. Facilitate communications and coordination between civilian organizations in order to minimize the requirements for MAGTF personnel, equipment, and supplies by coordinating and facilitating the usage of non-MAGTF resources. Minimize the use of MAGTF resources to meet civilian requirements, including the demands on the time of commanders and staffs. Maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Assist the MAGTF to meet the commander's legal and moral obligations to civilians in the MAGTF AO

3. () Execution.

a. () Concept of Operations. The CMOC is intended to provide "One-stop shopping" for interface between the MAGTF and civilians.

1. () The term civilian includes:

a. () Other US and allied Government agencies NATO (e.g. USAID, OFDA, FEMA)

b. () HN Security/ Law Enforcement agencies

c. () Host Nation (HN) non-mil agencies (e.g. religious, relief efforts)

d. () HN political bodies (e.g. Governor, Mayor, Emergency Operations Center)

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- e. () International Organizations (IO) (e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC)).
 - f. () Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) (e.g. Oxford Famine Relief (OXFAM), Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Doctors Without Borders).
 - g. () Civilian inhabitants of the AO.
2. () The functions the CMOC provides include:
- a. () Validating civilian requests for support from MAGTF including:
 - 1. () Security escort.
 - 2. () C3 support.
 - 3. () Engineer support/ civil engineering.
 - 4. () Provide daily situation and security briefs to civilian agencies (not intended to replace JIB).
 - 5. () Promulgate and explain MAGTF policies to civilian agencies/ HN (Command continues to show personal respect to senior political structures).
 - 6. () Host /convene planning sessions among multiple agencies with differing skills, interests.
 - 7. () Administer and issue identification cards/passes to validated agencies and personnel.
 - 8. () Develop/ promulgate "911" system for response to civilian security contingencies.
 - 9. () Coordinate access to airport, ATC, ramp space, MHE, maintenance facilities and equipment.
 - 10. () Coordinate seaport access, mooring locations, Pilot/Tug support, pier space, cargo handling, MHE assets.
 - 11. () Frequency management.
 - 12. () Validate and process civilian requests for Space-A transport on Mil ACFT/Sea Lift (Pax and cargo).

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b. () Tasks.

1. () CSSE: Provide required facilities to maintain a 24-hour CMOC.
Provide logistics and embarkation representatives to facilitate planning.
2. (U) ACE: Be prepared to provide expertise about airfield operations and strategic lift tasking and requirements.
3. (U) GCE: Provide representatives to coordinate security escort for civilian operations.

c. () Coordinating Instructions: Major Subordinate Elements may establish local CMOCs in zone.

4. () Admin and Logistics.

a. () Equipment required by priority:

1. () Tentage:

- a. () CP/STICK UP for Ops (1st priority for electric power).
- b. (U) GP for Briefing (3d priority for electric power).
- c. (U) 2d CP/ STICK UP for NOFORN Ops (2d priority for electric power).

2. () Communications:

- a. () Wire to supported commander's Op's Center.
- b. () VHF/HF/ Cell phone to assessment personnel.
- c. () POTS telephone (Access to CINC/JTF J-5).
- d. () Fax capability.
- e. () LAN to MAGTF /MarFor Operations Centers.
- f. () LAN/ WAN to AMEMB.
- g. () NIPR/Internet access.
- h. () DSN access.
- i. () STU-III phone.

3. () Transportation:

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- a. ☐ Any 4WD.
- b. ☐ Any M998 (4 seat, High back).
- c. ☐ Civilian vehicle.
- d. ☐ 8+ pax vehicle.

4. ☐ Manning (as available): (Note: Notional for CMOC ISO a MEU)

- a. ☐ Director (Policy, Future Ops).
- b. ☐ Dep Director (Next 24 Hrs).
- c. ☐ Ops Chief (Current Ops, Comm guard).
- d. ☐ Admin asst (Security, driver)
- e. ☐ Log planner (Surface/Air transport)

5. ☐ Command and Control.

a. ☐ CMOC Location:

Located in vicinity of MAGTF Operations Center, allowing for simplest coordination. Walking distance best, outside protective wire of Ops Center. Allows use of field wire comm. For HA and NEO MSN's, this may be the CSSE's CSSOC

ii. ☐ Information Management.

a. (U) Asset Matrix

<u>Name of Organization</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Assets</u>	<u>Contact</u>
ICRC	Repatriation	35 Large Lorries, 4 contract Interpreters	Inmarsat
World Food Program	DC Feeding	12 Large Lorries, 120 Tons Wheat Flour	Internet address

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

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TRANSITION MATRIX ()

() REFERENCES:

a. () Relevant Op Order

b. () Maps and overlays

1. The Transition Matrix is a planning and coordination tool. It is primarily useful for communication between the MAGTF and external organizations, and should be designed or modified so that it can be shared among all appropriate agencies. It should usually be posted at the CMOC. The Transition Matrix is a working document: CMO planners should expect that it will require frequent updating and dissemination as operations progress.
2. The Transition Matrix should be prepared to support MAGTF and CMO Concepts of Operations with respect to timelines and responsibilities.

Transition	Week One	Week Two	Week Three	Week Four
Camp Management	USMC/HCR		HCR	
Registration	USMC/HCR			
Shelter				
Tents	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Blankets/Sleeping	USMC	HCR/UNICEF		
Bags				
Cots	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Table/Chairs	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Flooring	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR	
Shower facilities	USMC	USMC/HCR	OXFAM	
Sanitation				
Port-a-John	USMC		HCR/Contractor	
Contracting				
Sanitation/Supplies	USMC		HCR/Contractor	
Contracting				
Preventative Medicine	USMC		UNICEF/NGO	
Training/Education	USMC		UNICEF/NGO	
Water				
Source	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Pumps/Access	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Testing/Training	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Source	USMC/WFP	USMC/WFP	WFP	

		CLASSIFICATION			
Health Services	Education for Recipients	USMC	UNICEF/AICF	AICF/UNICEF	
	Specialized foods		UNICEF/AICF	AICF/UNICEF	
	Providers	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
	Equipment and supplies	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
	Preventative medicine Training	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
Infrastructure					
Transportation	Power	USMC	USMC/HCR/GREEN		
	Communications	USMC	USMC/HCR/GREEN		
	Fuel Supply/Dump	USMC		USMC/Contractor	
	Road Improvement	USMC		USMC/WFP/HCR	
	Warehousing	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP	
Logistics	Vehicles	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Drivers	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Maintenance	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Security convoys	USMC	USMC/GREEN		
	Supply all classes	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP/HCR	WFP
Security	Contracts	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR		
	Port operations	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP	
	Airport operations	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP	WFP	
	Internal Phy/sec	USMC	USMC/HCR		
Information	Information	USMC	USMC/UN/GREEN		
	S&E Self policing	USMC		USMC/GREEN	
	Convoy	USMC		USMC/GREEN	
	Port operations	USMC		USMC/GREEN/WFP	
	Airport operations	USMC		USMC/GREEN/WFP	
CMOC					
Education	Collecting and Gathering	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
	Dissemination	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
	System to address issues	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
	Physical premises	USMC	USMC/MNF/UN		
	Comms Infrastructure	USMC	USMC/UN		
Communications	Admin support	USMC	USMC/UN		
	JLC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP/HCR/UNICEF		
	School tents	USMC	UNICEF		
	Psycho-social care	UNICEF			
	Radio network/connectivity	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR		
Non Food Items	Telecommunication	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR		
	Cooking utensils	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		
	Jerry cans	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		
	Household items	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		

		CLASSIFICATION			
Environmental Protection					
Host Population					
	Health	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICEF			
	Nutrition	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICEF			
	Education	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICEF			
	Water/Sanitation	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICEF			
	Local Administration support	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICEF/HCR			
Contingency Planning					
	Preparedness profile				
	Contingency scenarios				
	Program issues				
	Response procedures				

NOTE: : Green = USMC control
: Yellow = Transition
: Blue = UN/NGO/HN Control

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APPENDIX E. CMO Graphics

Coordinating Draft Note: CMO graphics are currently under development by the joint CA community, lead by the US Army Special Operations Command at the Special Warfare Center And School. Updated graphics will be provided in the Final Draft of MCWP 3-33.1 as available.




Figure B-1. Sample DC Overlay

APPENDIX F. Sample language requirements

1. The relationship between the MAGTF and civilian populations and organizations must be enhanced via training and education. The preparation of a pocket-sized language and customs card as shown below can be rapidly prepared and produced, even aboard amphibious shipping in order to reinforce training.

<u>ENGLISH</u>	<u>ALBANIAN</u>	<u>PRONUCIATION</u>
HOW ARE YOU?(M)	Si Je? (F) Si Jeni?	Si JAY/ JAYnee?
HELLO	Tungjatjeta	ToonjAHyehtah
YES/NO	Po/Jo	Poh/Yoh
NOW	Tani	THAN-ee
GOODBYE	Lamtumire;	LahmtoomEER
PLEASE	Ju lutem	yoo IOOtehm
THANK YOU	Ju falem nderit	yoo fAHlehndEHree
BATHROOM	Nevojtoire	NAYvoTORay
TO EAT	Ha	HA
TO DRINK	Pi	PEE
FOOD	Ushqim	OOSHkim
THAT WAY	Ande	AN-day
TO THE RIGHT	Djathtas	DYAT-tas
TO THE LEFT	Majtas	MAJ-tas
OUTSIDE	Jashte	YASH-tay
INSIDE	Brenda	BRENDa
NORTH	Veri	VAIRee
SOUTH	Jug	Yug
EAST	Lindje	LINDyay
WEST	Perendim	PerENDim
SAFE	Kasaforte	KasahFORTay
FRIEND	Mik	Meek
ENEMY	Armik	ahrmEEk
DOCTOR	Mjek	Myeck
HOSPITAL	Spital	SPEEtal
PISTOL	Revolver	rehvohlVEHr
RIFLE	Pushke	pOOshk
MAN	Burre	BOORay
WOMAN	Grua	GROOah
----- (over) -----		
		
RELIGION: 85% MUSLIM 10%GREEK ORTHODOX		
Family/Clan MORE Important than Town/Country/Religion		
NOD OF HEAD UP AND DOWN MEAN'S "NO"		
SHAKING FROM SIDE TO SIDE MEANS "YES"		
<u>RULES FOR BEHAVIOR WITH CIVILIANS</u>		
DO SMILE!!!!KEEP MILITARY BEARING		
DO treat civilians with respect and dignity		
DO show respect for all religions		
DO shake hands upon meeting and departing		
DO allow civilians to stand within one foot of you		
DO respect their cultures and traditions		
DO NOT turn down a request directly. Suggest you will ask your OIC and try to help		
DO NOT directly disagree about politics or religion		
DO NOT photograph civilians, especially women, without their permission		
DO NOT DISCUSS operational details with civilians, including US media.		